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ARTICLES
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, REMEDY,
AND LITIGATION REFORM
BRENDAN S. MAHER
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) rewrote the
law of private health insurance. How the ACA rewrote the law of civil
remedies, however, is a question largely unexamined by scholars. Courts
everywhere, including the U.S. Supreme Court, will soon confront this
important issue.
This Article offers a foundational treatment of the ACA on remedy. It predicts
a series of flashpoints over which litigation reform battles will be fought. It
identifies several themes that will animate those conflicts and trigger others. It
explains how judicial construction of the statute’s functional predecessor, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), converted a
protective statute into a uniquely effective piece of federal litigation reform.
Ultimately, it considers whether the ACA—which incorporates, modifies, and
rejects ERISA in several notable ways—will experience a similar fate.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................ 650
I. Health Insurance Remedy Before the ACA ............................... 655
A. ERISA Remedy ................................................................... 656
B. State Law Remedy .............................................................. 662
C. ERISA Realism ................................................................... 664
 Associate Professor and Robert D. Paul Scholar, University of Connecticut School
of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., Stanford University. This Article benefited from
presentation of an earlier draft at the University of Michigan’s “Regulation of Benefit
Plans: The Most Consequential Subject to Which No One Pays Enough Attention”
conference on March 22, 2013. I thank the conference participants for their
comments and criticism. All errors and foolish notions, of course, are mine alone. I
thank the University of Connecticut School of Law for the research grant that made
the completion of this work possible.

649

MAHER.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 2:41 PM

650

[Vol. 63:649

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

II.

Remedial Concepts in the ACA .................................................. 668
A. Internal Review .................................................................. 668
B. External Review ................................................................. 670
C. Judicial Review ................................................................... 672
D. Remedial Interaction and Litigation Reform .................. 674
III. ACA Litigation Reform Battles: Realism and Specifics ............ 675
A. Realist Influences Reconsidered ....................................... 676
B. Litigation Reform Specifics ............................................... 678
1. Self-insured plans ......................................................... 679
2. Group-insured plans .................................................... 685
3. Individual insurance .................................................... 692
IV. ACA Litigation Reform Themes ................................................. 700
A. Flexible Jurisprudential Devices ....................................... 701
B. The ACA as Consumer Choice ......................................... 704
C. The ACA as Anti-Judicialism ............................................. 706
D. The ACA as Non-Judicial Justice ....................................... 712
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 713
INTRODUCTION
Tort reform is a loaded term. Reform, after all, is multi-directional:
it can make rules more or less friendly to plaintiffs. For practical
purposes, however, tort reform aims to alter legal rules so that
plaintiffs have a harder time getting to court, winning, or collecting
damages. Tort reform’s larger but equally loaded cousin, litigation
reform, is simply reform applied to all claims, not just tort.1
For a long time, tort reform got most of the press.2 Recently,
however, litigation reform has crept onto front and opinion pages.3

1. Litigation reform is called by other names, for example “justice reform,”
“lawsuit reform,” and “legal reform.” See American Tort Reform Foundation, JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES, http://www.judicialhellholes.org (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) (listing
litigation reform organizations that employ those terms). Although these terms can
be used interchangeably, for the purposes of this Article, I use “litigation reform.”
2. See, e.g., Philip K. Howard, Why Medical Malpractice Is Off Limits, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 14, 2008, 10:29 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020448
8304574432853190155972.html (emphasizing the enormous cost of medical
malpractice); Alicia Mundy, Bush Legacy Could Be Found in Tort Reform, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 14, 2008, 7:53 PM), http://live.wsj.com/video/bush-legacy-could-be-found-intort-reform/15854491-F804-4CCD-8D04-B912CCE9D90D.html#!15854491-F804-4CC
D-8D04-B912CCE9D90D (assessing the George W. Bush administration’s primary
strategy related to tort reform, namely federal preemption); Anne Underwood,
Would Tort Reform Lower Costs?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://prescriptions
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/would-tort-reform-lower-health-care-costs (discussing
some of the theories behind medical practice costs and offering other explanations for
the high cost of medical care).
3. See, e.g., Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011), http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html?_r=0 (complaining that the Supreme
Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), “will bar
many Americans from enforcing their rights in court and, in many cases like this one,
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News tracks power, and the current Supreme Court is more solicitous
of litigation reform—and more willing to act on that preference—
than any Court in living memory. Since John G. Roberts, Jr. became
Chief Justice in 2005, the Court has issued landmark decisions
regarding pleading, arbitration, and class actions that have
significantly curtailed plaintiffs’ abilities to bring and win lawsuits.4
Whether that is desirable, disastrous, or somewhere in between
depends on your point of view.
Litigation reform is particularly relevant to health care legislation.
Health insurance is a contentious matter, in both the grand and petty
sense. Policy intuitions differ fiercely, and there are frequent
coverage disputes. Unsurprisingly, the appropriate remedy for the
wrongful denial of a health insurance claim has long been a subject
of intense interest for litigation reformers and their opponents.5
Overly expansive remedies are decried as wasting money on the
litigious; overly restrictive remedies are attacked as saving money on
the backs of the sick. These policy quarrels are complicated by
questions of statutory authority, namely, whether federal or state
regulators get to decide the rules of remedy. Further, the collective
amount of money at stake is enormous.
Enter the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 20106
(ACA). The ACA unquestionably rewrote the law of private health
insurance in America. Whether and how it rewrote the law of civil
remedies, however, is an important—and, to date, completely
unconsidered—question of statutory federalism. This Article offers a

bar them from enforcing rights at all”); see also infra note 4 (listing several prolitigation reform Supreme Court opinions from the Roberts Court).
4. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011)
(defining “common question” inquiry in class actions narrowly); AT&T Mobility, 131
S. Ct. at 1750–51 (preempting a California law limiting the use of collective action
waivers); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007) (requiring that a
well-pleaded complaint contain sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate
entitlement for relief). The taste for litigation reform is likely related to the
presence of a Court friendlier to business than ever. See Lee Epstein, William M.
Landes, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1431, 1472 (2013) (finding a pro-business slant in the Roberts Court).
5. See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 319–20, 332–33 (1985) (arguing
that “tort liability is a poor vehicle for choosing risks because judges and juries have
little capacity to make risk choices wisely”); Abigail Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s
Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2323, 2329–30 (2010) (noting that is has been “long recognized [that] generalist juries
and judges are bad at understanding, evaluating, and creating healthcare regulations”).
6. The legislation is actually comprised of two acts: the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) and the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). In
this Article, following convention, I refer to these acts collectively as “the ACA.”
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foundation for the treatment of the ACA on remedy. It predicts a
series of flashpoints over which litigation reform battles will be
fought. It identifies several themes that will animate those conflicts
and trigger others. And it explains how judicial construction of the
statute’s functional predecessor, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 19747 (ERISA), converted a protective statute into a
uniquely effective piece of federal litigation reform. Ultimately, it
considers whether the ACA—which incorporates, modifies, and
rejects ERISA in several notable ways—will experience a similar fate.
Part I supplies essential background by explaining the pre-ACA
world. Prior to 2010, the most important statute regarding health
insurance remedy was ERISA, which governs “benefit plan”
arrangements incident to employment, including employment-based
health insurance. This Part explains how ERISA’s rules on coverage
denial claims heavily favor insurers over claimants. Those rules limit
available causes of action, damages, and the right to a jury. They also
severely restrict the availability and scope of judicial review in a way
that surprises the casual observer. Claimants must exhaust an
insurer’s internal review procedures before suing in court. If the
plan so provides—and virtually all of them do—reviewing judges
must “defer” to the determination of the internal reviewer and affirm
his finding, unless it was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and
capricious.8 Such judicial deference is due even with respect to
conflicted review, i.e., where the party reviewing claims is controlled
by or beholden to the party obliged to pay claims.
By 2010, nearly 150 million people who received insurance
through an employer were subject to ERISA and its remedial
scheme.9 Because of ERISA’s unusual preemptive scope, state ability
to effectively regulate employment-sponsored insurance in a claimant
friendly way is minimal. States can and did, however, regulate the
vastly smaller “individual insurance” market; ERISA applies only to
employment-sponsored insurance. In contrast to ERISA, state
insurance law generally takes a more pro-claimant approach,
7. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).
8. For explanatory purposes, in the Introduction I use “insurer” and “benefit
plan” interchangeably. For the purpose of my analysis, distinctions between the two
that would matter elsewhere will not matter here.
9. See GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC.
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, 2012 ANNUAL SURVEY 1 (2012), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345-employer-healthbenefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (noting that “[e]mployer-sponsored
insurance is the leading source of health insurance in America, covering about 149
million nonelderly people”). Because of limited statutory exceptions, a small
number of people with employment-sponsored insurance are not covered by ERISA.
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providing broader legal remedies, including multiple causes of
action; interpretative doctrines favoring insureds; compensatory,
usually consequential, and sometimes punitive, damages; and jury
rights. State limits on claimant rights pale in comparison to those
imposed by ERISA.
Why ERISA diverged so materially from state law on remedy has
long interested scholars. Explanations differ, but legal realism offers
the most persuasive account.10 Judicial extra-statutory concerns about
the cost of health care, the lack of a suitable alternative to employmentbased health insurance, and a profound skepticism toward the utility of
remedy in general were significant, if not dominant, variables in reading
ERISA as the judiciary has done. How those concerns might influence
interpretation of the ACA is an open question.
Part II offers a conceptual summary of the ACA on remedy.11 The
Act contemplates three remedial options for claimants: internal,
external, and judicial review. Internal review refers to claim
processes administered by insurers or their designees. External
review refers to claim review processes handled by “independent
review organizations” regulated by the government. Judicial review is
litigation. Having all three options is a boon to claimants; however,
having one option limit the others may not be. Unfortunately, the
ACA is not perfectly clear about how the various remedial options
interact. Is each option actually optional? Must one form of review be
used before others? Must later reviewers defer to the conclusions of an
earlier reviewer? Does the use of internal or external review extinguish
judicial review or certain forms of relief? And which regulator has the
power to resolve these—and other significant—questions?
Part III supplies answers. The core notion is simple: an insured’s
available remedies depend on the type of insurance arrangement at
issue. For Type A insurance, federal regulators answer questions of
remedy. For Type B insurance, federal or state regulators answer,
with the division of authority not clear. For Type C insurance, state
10. What legal realism constitutes is subject to dispute among legal philosophers.
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 755 n.21
(2013) (describing variant schools of legal realism). I take no sides. I use the term
herein to mean, broadly, the expectation that judges bring more to bear on
interpreting the law than reading glasses and formal logic, and that their policy
preferences influence, sometimes profoundly, the decisional law they produce. Cf.
id. (identifying scholars who “conceiv[e] [r]ealism in terms of a judge’s general
(rather than case-specific) policy or ideological preferences”). See generally MARK
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 120 (2009) (describing the realist view
that “a judge given a principle articulated in some prior case could faithfully deploy
that principle along with others equally available in the doctrinal universe to reach
whatever result the judge thought socially desirable”).
11. I define remedy fairly broadly. See infra Part I.A.
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regulators answer, subject to a federal regulatory floor designed to
protect consumers.12
Type A insurance arrangements are so-called “self-insured plans.”
Self-insured plans are benefit plans that pay their employees’ health
costs directly, without an insurance company as intermediary. The
remedies for self-insured plans are defined entirely by ERISA and the
ACA. How the ACA modifies ERISA is clear in some ways; in others it
is not. Type B insurance arrangements are benefit plans using a
group insurer to cover their employees. These arrangements are
governed by a complicated welter of ERISA, ACA, and state law. The
divisions of authority are not clear, but the ACA may expand state
ability to regulate group insurers, at the expense of ERISA. Type C
insurance arrangements are individual insurance policies, which are
governed by the ACA and state law.
The ACA’s insurance
marketplace reforms—the mandate, limited risk underwriting, and
subsidies—will make the individual insurance market larger than it
has been in decades.13 That the ACA exercises power over the greatly
expanded individual market will prompt questions about the degree
to which the ACA displaces state prerogative on internal, external,
and judicial review.
Interwoven with the Article’s explanation of how the ACA’s
remedial regime works are predictions and observations about likely
litigation reform flashpoints.14 For each type of insurance, I highlight
particular conflicts likely to consume litigant and judicial resources.
For example, for self-insured plans, a key battle will likely be over the

12. I use alphabetical classification to make the scheme comprehensible. “Type
A/B/C” does not appear in the ACA. I consider only private health insurance, not
Medicare or Medicaid. See generally infra note 127 (discussing unusual private
insurance arrangements not here considered).
13. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE
PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT
DECISION 20 tbl.3 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf (projecting that roughly 25
million people will receive insurance through exchanges between 2019 and 2022).
Based on its explanatory notes, the CBO report appears to sensibly include those
receiving coverage through employers using small business exchanges in the
“Employer” line estimate (rather than in the “Exchanges” estimate). Id. Even if the
exchange estimates include employer exchange purchases, the overwhelming
majority of the 25 million people in the exchanges would be individual purchasers
subject to state law.
14. I assume throughout, unless otherwise noted, that the current federal
regulations are within the relevant federal agencies’ power. In other words, the
intent here is not to assess the degree to which agency regulations will survive judicial
scrutiny if challenged, but rather to ask what the ACA—under the current statutory
text and regulations—means for remedy and litigation reform. Certainly the
question of how agency positions on the ACA will survive challenge is important. But
that question requires a full-length treatment all its own.
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degree to which judges must defer to the determinations of external
reviewers. For group-insured plans, a crucial dispute will be over how
much the ACA’s amending of ERISA empowers the states to regulate
group plans without fear of preemption. For individual insurance,
the central question will be whether the ACA’s regulation of all
insurance policies can serve as a ledge to impose, nationwide,
litigation reform features inspired by ERISA. Other flashpoints are
also surveyed.
In Part IV, I step back from the specific and consider big picture
remedial “themes” of the ACA that will animate the above battles and
trigger others. Given the elasticity of two jurisprudential devices likely
to influence construction of the ACA—namely, preemption and intrafederal statutory conflict resolution—thematic analysis bears
heightened predictive and descriptive power. I consider three
remedial themes that could be advanced by interested players: the
ACA as consumer choice, the ACA as anti-judicialism, and the ACA as
non-judicial justice. Put simply, litigation reform opponents will favor
the first, litigation reformers the second, and true federalists the third.
The Article concludes by speculating about the ACA’s fate. It
could become what it reads to be: mildly progressive federalism on
remedy, in which states may freely fashion remedial regimes
consistent with modest consumer-protective floors defined by federal
agencies. Alternatively, it could transform the nation’s system of
health insurance remedies into some version of “ERISA for all.” The
former is more likely, but the latter—a litigation reformer’s dream—
is not impossible.
I.

HEALTH INSURANCE REMEDY BEFORE THE ACA

Before beginning, I should offer a preliminary comment on the
meaning of “remedy.” While elsewhere it may have a narrower
meaning, herein I mean remedy quite broadly, namely, any and all of
the formal processes and recoveries available to an insured who is
denied coverage.
Health insurance remedies before the ACA were defined by two
sources of law: ERISA and state law, or a combination of the two.15
ERISA governed the remedial scheme for employment-based
insurance,16 and state law governed insurance purchased on the

15. Cf. Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits, and Bad Faith: Losing Sight of
the Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 387, 395 (2009) (addressing the
inadequacy of remedies within ERISA).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012).
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individual market.17 ERISA’s preemptive scope significantly limited a
state’s ability to regulate remedy for employment-based arrangements.18
Because many more people were covered by employment-sponsored
insurance rather than individual insurance,19 as a practical matter,
ERISA has been much more significant in defining health insurance
remedies than has state law.
ERISA and state law’s treatment of remedy are crucial predicates to
the ACA’s remedial scheme, for several reasons. First, the ACA built
upon ERISA and state law, and, in many important respects, ERISA
and state law are still controlling authority. Second, regardless of any
continued vitality or formal connection to the ACA, ERISA and state
law’s treatment of remedy will unquestionably inform resolutions of
the ACA’s uncertainties. Third, as is more fully explored in Part
III.A, the degree to which pre-ACA matters of remedy, particularly
ERISA, were influenced by extra-statutory judicial impulses must
factor in to any realistic appraisal of how the ACA will be interpreted.
A. ERISA Remedy
ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect the pensions and health
benefits of working Americans.20 It does not require that an
employer offer benefits.21 However, if an employer does offer
benefits, ERISA regulates the benefit arrangement.22
ERISA requires that benefits be administered pursuant to a legal
construct called a “benefit plan.”23 The plan is operated by a “named
fiduciary,” who in turn engages other fiduciaries to administer the
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (showing Congress’s clear intent to control
regulation over employee benefit plans); see also infra Part II.C.
19. “Individual, or non-group, health insurance covers about 14 million
nonelderly people in America, making it the least common source of health
insurance. In contrast, about 157 million nonelderly people are covered by
employer-sponsored insurance.” KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SURVEY OF PEOPLE WHO
PURCHASE THEIR OWN INSURANCE 1 (2010), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation
.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8077-r.pdf.
20. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829, 832–33 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001); see also Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361
(1980) (noting that ERISA was enacted after “almost a decade of studying the
Nation’s private pension plans”). For a detailed discussion of the interesting political
history of ERISA, see JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 51–52 (2004).
21. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648 (2010) (stating that
Congress enacted ERISA to ensure employees received the benefits they earned, but
did not require employers to establish benefits plans in the first place).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)–(c) (establishing specific requirements for alreadyexisting employee benefit plans and private pension plans).
23. Id. § 1002 (defining any employee welfare plan or pension plan as a
“benefit plan”).
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plan.24 Should the fiduciary violate ERISA’s requirements or the
terms of the governing plan document, ERISA provides various “civil
enforcement” mechanisms to beneficiaries.25 One mechanism is a
federally created cause of action to remediate a wrongfully denied
health benefit.26 This statutory remedy is set forth in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and is often shorthanded as the “benefits” remedy.27
If, for example, the plan promised to pay for Treatment A in
Circumstance A, a beneficiary in Circumstance A being denied
coverage of Treatment A could sue for the “benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan.”28 It is ERISA’s statutory analog to a
breach of contract claim.
Several crucial limitations have been grafted onto this benefitdenial remedy. These limitations involve exhaustion, deference,
damages, and restricted jury rights.
Exhaustion. Limitation one is that a beneficiary must “exhaust” the
plan’s internal claims process before being permitted to seek judicial
relief.29 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted this
requirement, it has spoken favorably of it,30 and the circuits have
overwhelmingly imposed “exhaustion” as a precondition to suit.31
Setting aside the policy wisdom of this limitation, ERISA by its
terms imposes no such “exhaustion” requirement. Instead, it speaks
of plans being required to provide beneficiaries with an
“opportunity” for “full and fair review” of a benefit denial by the plan
24. Id. § 1102(a).
25. Id. § 1132.
26. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
27. See Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U.
L. REV. 433, 453 n.151 (2010) (describing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) as the
“benefits” remedy).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The statute actually uses “his,” rather than
gender-neutral language.
29. Id. § 1133(1)–(2) (setting forth ERISA’s internal claims procedure).
Exhaustion—even without deference—is a modest form of litigation reform. “In
fact, all but a few plan participants fail to complete the arduous appeal process
available to them even before this new, external level of review.” Katherine T.
Vukadin, Hope or Hype?: Why the Affordable Care Act’s New External Review Rules for
Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Reform, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2012).
30. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 258 (2008)
(Roberts, J., concurring) (describing the administrative exhaustion requirement
as a “safeguard[] for plan administrators” that is “recognized by almost all the
Courts of Appeals”).
31. Id.; see also Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 93 F.3d 397, 401–02 (7th
Cir. 1996) (noting Seventh Circuit precedent that courts may require exhaustion of
administrative proceedings); Diaz v. United Agric. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan, 50
F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating a general rule that a claimant must exhaust
internal claims procedures before bringing a lawsuit); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13
F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that claimant must exhaust administrative
remedies prior to suing); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st
Cir. 1988) (finding an exhaustion requirement).
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fiduciary.32 As scholars have tirelessly but futilely pointed out, an
opportunity is not a requirement.33
Deference. Limitation two is that plans possess the power to force
courts to “defer” to the judgment of the internal reviewer. In a case
called Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,34 the Supreme Court held that
courts should review benefit denial claims de novo unless the plan
document confers interpretative discretion upon fiduciaries charged
with administering the plan.35 In that case, courts must “defer” to the
fiduciary’s determination, unless he has acted arbitrarily and
capriciously.36 To capture Firestone deference, virtually all plans confer
discretion on those who consider and review benefit claims.37
Moreover, even if a beneficiary establishes that a fiduciary is
conflicted, the fiduciary is still entitled to deference. In such a case, a
judge is simply asked to scrutinize more closely the fiduciary’s
finding, with the scrutiny intensifying in proportion to the likelihood
the conflict affected the decision.38 Moreover, deference does not
evaporate if the fiduciary behaves arbitrarily and capriciously in
resolving the benefit claim. In that event, the court should merely
vacate the fiduciary’s conclusion and remand it back to the fiduciary
for a second bite at the apple.39 Only when a fiduciary’s behavior
amounts to bad faith can a court conclusively resolve the matter.40
Deference, like exhaustion, does not grace ERISA’s pages.41 It is a
judicial gloss long attacked by scholars.42 ERISA contemplates that

32. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
33. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting
the Benefit Promise, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 657, 674–76 (arguing that, as both a textual and
policy matter, it is unlikely that ERISA requires administrative exhaustion).
34. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
35. Id. at 115.
36. Id. at 109.
37. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315,
1324 (2007) (observing that “[p]lan drafters routinely seize upon Bruch’s invitation
to instruct the courts to defer to plan decisionmaking”).
38. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008) (explaining that a
conflict of interest “should prove more important . . . where circumstances suggest a
higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision”).
39. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1651 (2010) (holding that district
court erred in refusing “to defer to the Plan Administrator’s interpretation of the
Plan on remand, simply because the Court of Appeals had found a previous related
interpretation by the Administrator to be invalid”).
40. See id. at 1647. A finding of bad faith does not create a bad faith cause of
action under ERISA. It simply means that the court can interpret the insurance
contract on its own. Precisely what the Court means by “bad faith” is not clear.
41. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109 (“ERISA does not set out the appropriate
standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit
eligibility determinations.”).
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the fiduciaries charged with deciding benefit claims may be
employed, controlled, or otherwise influenced by the party obligated
to pay on those claims.43 A rule of judicial deference to a likelyconflicted decision maker makes little sense, and no sense at all in the
context of a statute designed to protect the interests of beneficiaries.44
Damages. Limitation three relates to damages. In 1985, in an
opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court ruled that “extracontractual,” or consequential, damages are not recoverable.45
Instead, the Court held that a beneficiary may only recover the value
of the denied benefit.46 That is, if a wrongfully denied or delayed
benefit led to death or permanent injury, consequential damages are
not available. Observers across the board, including scholars like
Richard Epstein, have questioned the wisdom of this limitation.47
That a party who suffers a legally cognizable injury has a right, in
appropriate circumstances, to recover foreseeable damages arising
from that injury is one of American law’s foundational principles. If
Congress chose to eliminate such a natural feature of civil relief, one
would expect Congress’s choice to have been varnished with statutory
ink. No such limitation appears in ERISA’s text.48
42. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
207, 217–20 (criticizing deference); Langbein, supra note 37, at 1336–42 (same);
Maher & Stris, supra note 27, at 471–73 (same).
43. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 1316, 1325, n.69 (explaining that “ERISA
fiduciaries are commonly aligned with the employer” and noting that “[m]ost ERISA
plan benefit denials are the work of conflicted decisionmakers”).
44. See Maher & Stris, supra note 27, at 472–73 (arguing that deferential review
encourages self-serving benefit determinations and increases the complexity of
promises). Many states have attempted to limit the use of discretionary clauses,
although whether those efforts will survive ERISA preemption is not settled. See
generally Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56 S.D. L.
REV. 500 (2011) (analyzing discretionary clause bans).
45. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
46. Id. at 144 (finding no “express authority for an award of extracontractual
damages to a beneficiary”).
47. See Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious
Liability, ERISA Preemption, and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 642 (2001)
(acknowledging that the argument in favor of consequential damages under ERISA
“has considerable force and may in the end be convincing”); see also George Lee
Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARIZ.
L. REV. 611, 617–20 (1994).
48. Moreover, ERISA provides two other significant remedies to beneficiaries
under § 1132(a)(2) and (a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)–(3) (2012).
The
§ 1132(a)(2) remedy is designed to police errant fiduciaries. The § 1132(a)(3)
remedy is a “catch-all” remedy sounding in equity. Those remedies, while limited in
other ways, are less restrictive than the “benefits” remedy. However, the Supreme
Court has held that, absent unusual circumstances, a beneficiary may only avail
himself of the remedies set forth in § 1132(a)(2) and § 1132(a)(3) if the benefits
remedy is not applicable. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996)
(surmising that where Congress has provided adequate relief for a beneficiary’s
injury, there will be no need for (a)(3) relief). Numerous lower courts have
explicitly held that the availability of the benefits remedy bars the use of other ERISA
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Restricted jury rights. Limitation four relates to jury trials. In
federal courts, ERISA benefit disputes are heard by a judge, not a
jury. The rationale, roughly, is that ERISA is a codified form of trust
law.49 In the days of the divided bench, trust disputes were resolved
by equity courts.50 Thus, so the reasoning goes, ERISA claims—
including simple disputes over coverage, which, in reality, resemble
nothing more than contract claims—are “equitable” in nature and
are thus heard by a judge.51
Scholars have criticized this
reasoning.52 The Supreme Court has not considered the issue, but
the circuit courts of appeals are in broad agreement.53 ERISA itself
is silent on the question.54
remedies. See, e.g., Korotynska v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 474 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir.
2006) (“[Section] 1132(a)(3) authorizes some individualized claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, but not where the plaintiff’s injury finds adequate relief in another
part of ERISA’s statutory scheme.”); Ogden v. Blue Bell Creameries U.S.A., Inc., 348
F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining “that an ERISA plaintiff who has an
adequate remedy under Section 502(a)(1)(B) cannot alternatively plead and
proceed under Section 502(a)(3)”); Short v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 961 F. Supp.
261, 266 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (stating that because “§ 502(a)(1)(B) allows [the
plaintiff] to recover any benefits he is due under the plan[,] . . . relief under
§ 502(a)(3) is not appropriate”).
ERISA suggests no such restriction. None of the enumerated remedies condition
their availability on whether another remedy is applicable, and no remedy by its
terms bars use of another enumerated remedy. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1332
(providing guidelines for the civil enforcement of ERISA). Neither the fiduciary
remedy nor the equitable remedy is, as of this writing, subject to exhaustion or
deference. Making the benefits remedy the dominant remedy is a judicial gloss,
motivated, ironically enough, by a desire to protect the other judicial glosses of
exhaustion, deference, and no consequential damages.
49. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.”).
50. See Boone v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 163 F.2d 309, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1947)
(recognizing the inherent power of a court of equity to preside over the
administration of trusts).
51. See DeFelice v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir.
1997) (“[C]ases involving ERISA benefits are inherently equitable in nature, not
contractual, and . . . no right to jury trial attaches to such claims.”).
52. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims
Actions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 361 (1992) (explaining and criticizing federal courts’
“trust” reasoning to deny jury trials in ERISA actions).
53. The circuit courts of appeal that have considered the issue have held that
ERISA beneficiaries are not entitled to a jury trial. Muller v. First Unum Life Ins.
Co., 341 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Or. Fruit Prods. Co., 228 F.3d 991,
997 (9th Cir. 2000); Hampers v. W.R. Grace & Co., 202 F.3d 44, 54 (1st Cir. 2000);
Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 1998); Adams v.
Cyprus AMAX Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1998); Mathews v. Sears
Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1998); Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d
1308, 1324 (5th Cir. 1994); Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906
F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636
(3d Cir. 1989); Berry v. CIBA–GEIGY Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985); In
re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1982).
In contrast, for section 502(a)(1)(B) claims brought in state court, which ERISA
permits, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), state law on jury rights governs. Most state courts
award jury trials. See, e.g., Shaw v. Atl. Coast Life Ins. Co., 470 S.E.2d 382, 386 (S.C.
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ERISA as national litigation reform.
ERISA’s remedial system
exemplifies the preference of many litigation reformers. It is a (1)
mandatory, (2) no-damages, (3) private scheme of dispute resolution,
subject only to (4) modest agency regulation, (5) feeble judicial
oversight, and (6) no juries.
Moreover, because of ERISA’s
55
enormous preemptive reach, any state law that attempted to
“supplement” this remedial scheme was held to be in conflict with
ERISA’s purposes and thus preempted.56 The result: not only did
ERISA instantiate profound litigation reform, it made it national.
The irony is that ERISA, at the time of its passage, was hailed as
a landmark protective statute.57 One of its explicit purposes was to
provide beneficiaries with “appropriate remedies, sanctions, and

Ct. App. 1996) (“The majority of state courts, prior to and subsequent to the
enactment of ERISA, have viewed the plans as contractual, thus granting jury trials in
benefits-due lawsuits.”). The practical effect of this is limited because, even though a
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) action can be filed in either state or federal court, a defendant may
remove the dispute to federal court on federal question grounds. See, e.g., Clorox
Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 779 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that “ERISA contains no express provision against removal” and supplies no
other indication “that Congress intended to prevent removal of employee actions
filed in state courts”).
54. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1355
(2003) (“ERISA’s procedure and remedy sections are riddled with major omissions
that the courts have had to fill in, such as whether jury trial pertains, and what statute
of limitations to use.”); see also Flint, supra note 52, at 399 (“ERISA contains no
express provision granting a jury trial for benefits-due lawsuits . . . .”).
55. See infra note 67 (detailing the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause as
defined by judge-made law); infra Part IV.A (explaining preemption and, in
particular, conflict preemption).
56. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209, 221 (2004) (explaining that
state law is preempted if it “duplicates, supplements, or supplants” any of the civil
enforcement remedy provisions in section 502 of ERISA and holding that state-law
created causes of action against HMOs were preempted); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) (holding that wrongful termination cause of
action was preempted); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987)
(holding that Mississippi law of bad faith denial of insurance benefits was
preempted); Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56 S.D.
L. REV. 500, 512–13 (2011) (concluding that discretionary clauses in state laws are
likely not conflict preempted by the remedies provision of ERISA).
57. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4639 (1973) (“The primary purpose of [ERISA] is
the protection of individual pension rights . . . .”); 120 CONG. REC. at 29,935 (1974)
(“[A] pension reform law is now a reality because of the hardship, deprivation and
inequity suffered by American working people . . . . The discipline of law will enable
this and succeeding generations of workers to face their retirement period with
greater confidence and greater security . . . .”); 120 CONG. REC. 29,933, 29,935 (1974)
(referring to ERISA as a “pension ‘bill of rights’”); see also Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s
Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating
Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 358–60 (1994) (noting that the primary purpose of
ERISA was to protect beneficiaries from administrative and funding abuses); Peter J.
Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 349 (1998) (“ERISA was
enacted to inform and protect employees.”).
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ready-access to the Federal courts.”58 Instead, it turned into one of
the most effective pieces of federal litigation reform legislation
ever passed.
There is no tidy answer as to why this happened. The text of the
statute provides little justification; ERISA’s defining remedial features
are judicial emendations. What explains their creation? Legal
realism provides the most compelling explanation, one which not
only provides a more satisfying explanation to the Supreme Court’s
past behavior, but also sheds light on how the ACA might be
interpreted. I revisit this issue at more length in Part III.A. First, I
briefly discuss the differences between state insurance law and ERISA.
The former, under ACA, will become more important than it has
been in over thirty years.59
B. State Law Remedy
While state law varies, insured individuals seeking coverage under
state insurance law possess more expansive remedies than under
ERISA.60 Relative to ERISA, state law favors claimants by providing
broader legal remedies, including: multiple causes of action;
interpretative doctrines favoring insureds; compensatory, usually
consequential, and sometimes punitive, damages; and, jury rights.
Nevertheless, it is not the litigious free-for-all that is sometimes
suggested.61 Sensible limits exist, in some states more than others,
though none go nearly as far as ERISA.
Most states do not require that an insured exhaust any internal
grievance procedures beyond that which is necessary to make clear
that the insurer is actually denying coverage.62 Use of internal

58. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
59. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 20 tbl.3 (projecting that 25
million people will receive insurance through individual markets by 2022).
60. The citations in this section are generally taken from cases that involve
insurance generally, not just health insurance. Prior to the ACA, the individual
insurance markets that states regulated were sparsely populated. Supra note 19. For
that reason, expression of remedial insurance principles was more likely to come up
in cases involving matters other than health insurance.
61. See Donald T. Bogan, Saving State Law Bad-Faith Claims from Preemption, TRIAL,
Apr. 2003, at 57, 57–58 (noting that under state law plaintiffs may pursue, for
example, bad faith remedies not available under ERISA); Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum
Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1160 (2006)
(arguing that plaintiff-friendly states “exert a disproportionate negative influence
over law,” particularly with respect to class actions).
62. As the Solicitor General has explained: “state-law insurance claims . . .
generally involve no required exhaustion of plan remedies.” Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013) (No. 12-729). Absent some salient indication
that the insurer is denying coverage, the insured would have no standing to sue.
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procedures, if offered by the insurance company, is optional.63
Accordingly, state law does not maroon insureds in a system where
conflicted adjudicators play a central role in resolving claims. Nor
does the insurer benefit from favorable interpretative regimes.
Contracts of insurance were the first contracts described as contracts
of adhesion,64 and in many states the interpretation of insurance
contracts is either de novo or contra proferentem (where the insurance
policy is construed against the drafter).65
Various causes of action are available to remediate coverage
denials, as well as to recover consequential or even punitive damages,
if the insurer improperly delays or refuses to pay on the policy.66
Juries are available to most claimants.67 Numerous states authorize
some form of consequential and punitive damages in certain
circumstances, either via statute or under principles of their common
law.68 Limits on potential misuses of state remedies like “bad faith”
63. Id.
64. Indeed, “the first use of the term ‘contract of adhesion’ was in an article
dealing with the formation of insurance contracts.” Meier v. N.J. Life Ins. Co., 101
N.J. 597, 612 n.10 (1986) (citing Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance
Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
65. See 2 RCRA AND SUPERFUND: A PRACTICE GUIDE § 16:11 (3d ed. 2004)
(explaining that “unless the wording of the policies is actually drafted by the
insured or the insured’s representative, most courts will apply the contra
proferentem rule and, when faced with ambiguity, will adopt an interpretation of
the policy that favors the insured”).
66. In early insurance cases, the hoary Hadley-Baxendale rule limiting available
legal relief to foreseeable consequential damages was in some jurisdictions limited by
another principle, one limiting the damages in a failure to pay cases to the value of
the contract. See, e.g., Bob G. Freemon, Jr., Reasonable and Foreseeable Damages for
Breach of an Insurance Contract, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 108, 108 (1985) (discussing the
origins and limits on consequential damages in insurance cases). Such limits
motivated insurers to behave aggressively. Most states responded by recognizing
causes of action that permitted the recovery of consequential and punitive damages,
such as bad faith, as well as by enacting “penalty statutes to cover insurer abuses with
respect to claims.” Flint, supra note 47, at 658.
67. See Shaw v. Atl. Coast Life Ins. Co., 470 S.E.2d 382, 385 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996)
(concluding that most states view insurance disputes as contract disputes suitable for
a jury). Whether juries are “better” for plaintiffs than judges is a matter of some
dispute. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of
the Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 731 (2006) (examining mixed empirical research on
whether juries are friendlier to plaintiffs than judges). Whatever the actual answer,
litigation reformers routinely back measures that limit the jury. See, e.g., Huber, supra
note 5, at 319 (criticizing tort liability as determined by juries). The mid-1980s wave
of tort reform litigation imposed caps on non-economic damages to prevent
“runaway” jury awards. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM:
EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, at vii (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default
/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/report.pdf (“Although tort reform is a
continuing issue, it gained prominence in the mid-1980s, when many states enacted
reforms in response to a perceived problem in insurance costs.”).
68. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (2012) (25% penalty for bad faith refusal);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105(a) (2008) (25% penalty for bad faith refusal); Chavers v.
Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 7 (Ala. 1981) (per curiam) (recognizing bad
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exist as well.69 Damage caps nonspecific to insurance claims are also
in effect in several states.70
C. ERISA Realism
Why ERISA diverged so significantly from state law on remedy is a
puzzle. Textual explanations fail because ERISA’s statutory language
is at best scant with respect to the above-listed remedial limits
imposed by the judiciary. A legal realist account of judicial behavior
is more convincing. American legal realism71 contends that legal
outcomes depend both on official legal materials, like statutes and
precedents, as well as “nonlegal” forces, like policy preferences.72
Few scholars today believe that judges discharge their will
unconstrained by anything other than their own sense of discretion.
Virtually all credible observers accept that statutory language, agency
regulation, and precedent have some constraining power, although
there is disagreement over the details.73 Many, including me, believe
that Realist impulses (e.g., nonlegal motivations) will frequently
overcome modest statutory or precedential hurdles. Put another way:
if there is some ambiguity in a statute, extra-statutory inclinations are
likely to drive the resolution of disputes about the statute’s meaning.
From that perspective, with respect to ERISA, three particular
nonlegal concerns drove the interpretation of the statute: (1) the
cost and uncertainty of making health insurance promises; (2) the
lack of a suitable insurance alternative to employment-provided
insurance; and (3) general judicial hostility, from 1980 onward, to
expansive remedy.

faith claim against insurer); Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93–94
(Ct. App. 1970) (upholding damages award for intentional infliction of emotional
distress arising from bad faith insurance conduct); Arnold v. Nat’l Cnty. Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (recognizing a “cause of action for breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing” against insurers).
69. Douglas R. Richmond, The Two-Way Street of Insurance Good Faith: Under
Construction, But Not Yet Open, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 95, 143 (1996) (explaining that
insurers have a variety of defenses to bad faith claims, such as comparative bad faith,
recoupment, setoff, and breach of the policy’s cooperation clause).
70. See, e.g., Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901, 911 (Colo. 1993)
(en banc) (holding noneconomic damage cap to be constitutional); Univ. of Miami
v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 1993) (same); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med.
Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1116 (Idaho 2000) (same).
71. See supra note 10 (discussing the author’s intending meaning of legal
realism).
72. See Schauer, supra note 10, at 752–56 (detailing the various beliefs of
American legal realists). I sometimes use the term “extra-statutory” to mean
essentially the same thing as “nonlegal.”
73. See supra note 10 (listing variants of legal realism).
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Cost and uncertainty. Insurance is costly and uncertain. Cost is a
function of the insurance policy’s expected payout. The higher the
cost of the service the insurance has to provide in connection with a
loss event, the more costly the insurance policy will be to buy and
perform. As health care costs began to sharply rise in the 1980s and
thereafter, commentators expressed a multitude of theories as to why
costs were so high.74 There was little dispute that health care costs
were rising; the dispute was why. The breadth of a judicial remedy,
irrespective of whether it is a primary driver of rising health care
costs, increases the overall cost of making a health insurance promise.
Moreover, to the extent a judicial remedy is “volatile”—that is, likely
that two impartial adjudicators, on the same facts, will reach widely
different liability or damages determinations—the effective cost of
providing an insurance policy subject to this remedy increases for
risk-averse defendants.75
For judges aware of the problem of rising health costs and faced
with multiplying disputes over coverage decisions, a natural
temptation is to “trim” the remedy, so as to reduce the average cost
and volatility of offering health insurance.76 The degree to which
courts have acknowledged that concerns about cost influenced the
selection and application of legal rules varies, but there is little doubt
that cost plays a role.77 The only question about which reasonable
minds might disagree is how large a role cost concerns played in
driving the judiciary to fiercely cabin ERISA’s benefit denial remedy.

74. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
259 (1982) (noting an increase in medical costs attributable in part to scientific
and educational advances that improved quality of care); Jonathan B. Baker, The
Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transformation of the Hospital Industry, 51
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 95 (1988) (attributing health care cost increases to the
inefficiencies of “cost-based or charge-based reimbursement for health care”); Paul
B. Ginsburg, Alternative Approaches to Health Care Cost Containment, 30 JURIMETRICS J.
447, 448–52 (1990) (surveying the varying success of cost containment policies and
the reasons for their lack of success); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care
System and How To Fix It: An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
537, 547–49 (2006) (attributing increasing costs of health care to a variety of
variables, such as improvements in technology and growing proportion of elderly);
Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531,
535–36 (1968) (explaining why moral hazard in health insurance leads to upward
price pressure).
75. See Maher & Stris, supra note 44, at 470 (arguing that volatility in benefit
promises increases the cost of providing insurance).
76. See id. (suggesting that eliminating consequential damages could address
concerns related to increasing cost).
77. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (voicing concern
that the rule urged by the plaintiff would impose high insurance costs upon persons
who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans and would discourage
growth of private pension plans).
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Lack of a suitable alternative. A second reality regarding the
availability of health insurance amplifies the weight of the cost
concerns. Because of the nature of insurance economics, health
insurance options outside of group markets are often costly or
unavailable.78 Individual insurance transactions are hamstrung by the
problem of adverse selection, where the person seeking insurance
could pose a greater payout risk than the insurer is able to ascertain
and charge for.79 Group insurance is less risky for the insurer. The
larger the group, the more the insurance risk will approach the risk
of insuring the entire community, and community risk is, generally
speaking, ascertainable by insurers.80 Employment-based insurance,
a form of group insurance, thus lessens the hurdles of adverse
selection and provides important access to health insurance—access
that an individual could not, on his own, obtain as inexpensively, or
perhaps even at all.81
ERISA does not require employers to offer health insurance to
their employees.82 Thus, to the extent offering insurance becomes, in
employers’ minds, too costly or too volatile, employers in the preACA world might stop offering it, leaving their employees with no
realistic alternative.83 When assessing questions about the contour of
the ERISA benefit denial remedy, judges would have been hard
pressed to ignore the consequences of interpreting the remedy
expansively. If employers were deterred from offering insurance
because of the cost and uncertainty associated with generous
remedies—for example, runaway damage awards for pain and
suffering—then quite literally many millions of Americans would
have become unable to obtain health insurance.
Judicial hostility. Finally, since the election of Ronald Reagan in
1980, the federal judiciary has been reluctant to afford expansive
remedies to plaintiffs in a wide variety of contexts.84 As Professors
78. See Peter Diamond, Organizing the Health Insurance Market, 60 ECONOMETRICA
1233, 1236–37 (1992) (explaining that in individual markets, high risk individuals
may be rejected or unable to obtain affordable coverage).
79. Id.
80. This assumes the group is one organized for some purpose other than to buy
insurance; the group must be aggregated along some dimension that is orthogonal
to risk.
81. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining that health insurance
outside of group markets is often costly or unavailable).
82. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
83. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 402 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern that expanded remedies “could create a disincentive
to the formation of employee health benefit plans”).
84. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
343, 345–62 (identifying four important Supreme Court cases that advance a
“constricted view of statutory interpretation and of the scope of judicial power to
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Meltzer and Resnick have explained, judges skeptical of the utility of
court access and broad remedies, and fearful of their abuse by
opportunistic plaintiffs’ lawyers, have enjoyed rising reputations and
influence since 1980.85 Several such judges sat on or are currently
sitting on the Supreme Court.86
It is important to distinguish the realist motivation of “hostility to
remedy” from the other realist motivations discussed above. A person
could very easily be neutral on the general question of remedy and
yet be inclined to interpret ERISA remedies narrowly for fear of cost
and lack of an insurance alternative. One would expect such a
person to alter his or her judicial behavior upon alleviation of those
concerns, rather than reading litigation reform into a statute. In
contrast, a judge with a natural skepticism regarding the utility of
remedy will be more likely, if not eager, to trim remedies in any case
where a statute does not prohibit him or her from doing so.
The objective here is not to prove beyond cavil that extra-statutory
influences drove ERISA interpretation; full treatments of that
question, and constituent parts thereof, have been undertaken
elsewhere.87 The point instead is to ask, if the extra-statutory
flesh out federal enactments in service of statutory and constitutional purposes”);
Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power,
78 IND. L.J. 223, 256–58 (2003) (discussing how Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), represents a shift in understanding of federal
remedial powers).
85. See Meltzer, supra note 84, at 345–62; Resnik, supra note 84, at 256–58; see also
infra note 86 and accompanying text (describing the previous and current makeup
of the Supreme Court and its attitude toward broad court remedies).
86. Professor Andrew Siegel has argued that a defining feature of the Rehnquist
Court (1986–2005) was its hostility “towards the institution of litigation and its
concomitant skepticism as to the ability of litigation to function as a mechanism for
organizing social relations and collectively administering justice.” Andrew M. Siegel,
The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2006). The Roberts Court
(2005–present) has offered no indication it feels differently. See Editorial, supra note
3. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito are widely
believed to be skeptical of broad court remedies. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431,
1472–73 (2013) (observing a shift of conservative Justices in favor of business
interests following the appointment of Roberts and Alito and noting that “the
Roberts Court is much friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist
Courts, which preceded it, were”). Past Justices Burger and O’Connor criticized the
perils of expansive remedy. See, e.g., Richard de Uriarte, Good Lawyer/Bad Lawyer:
O’Conner’s Criticism of Contingency Fees Provokes Debate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 2001 at
V.1 (describing Justice O’Connor’s criticism of “out-of-control class action lawsuits
and outrageous contingency fees” as being earlier expressed by Justice Burger).
87. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 33, at 659 (identifying concerns about promise
costs as having influenced the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA); Dana M.
Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 425–26 (2000) (describing and criticizing the settlor
doctrine); Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of
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concerns listed above played a meaningful role in converting ERISA
from a protective statute into a vehicle for litigation reform, to what
degree will the ACA be molded by those same influences? Obviously
that answer depends upon (1) the degree to which the ACA is
flexible enough to yield to moderately realist interpretative behavior,
and (2) the power the three nonlegal forces that affected ERISA
exert on today’s judges. I consider both questions in Part III. In Part
II, to set the table, I offer a conceptual summary of the remedial
concepts in the ACA.
II. REMEDIAL CONCEPTS IN THE ACA
What the ACA says about remedy is short—a single section of
code—but it presents considerable complexity.88 To understand the
effect that section has on remedy requires familiarity with multiple
sources of authority outside the ACA.89 Before plunging into those
intricacies, I provide a conceptual sketch of the legislation’s three
tracks of remedy.
Only one section of the ACA directly considers remedy.90 It
contemplates three important remedial concepts: internal review,91
external review,92 and judicial review. Section 2719 directly speaks to the
first two, and indirectly speaks to the third. I consider each below.93
A. Internal Review
The ACA contemplates an “internal claims appeal process”, which I
refer to as “internal review,” for coverage claims by insureds.94 Stated
simply, internal review is a procedure for processing beneficiaries’
claims and appeals that is administered by the insurer or its

ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 133 (2009) (arguing that the Court has prioritized cost
reduction over protecting beneficiaries, contrary to congressional wishes).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2012).
89. To wit: the ACA explicitly refers to, and relies on (1) state law; (2) complex
federal regulations old and new; (3) the discretion of the Departments of Labor,
Treasury, and Health and Human Services; and (4) ERISA. Perhaps more
importantly, making sense of the ACA remedy provision requires understanding the
federal-state division of authority prior to its passage, a power allocation defined
almost entirely by ERISA preemption doctrine.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19.
91. Id. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(A).
92. Id. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(B).
93. Section 2719, standing alone, does not resolve how the three interact. See
infra Part II.D (discussing the ACA’s lack of guidance regarding how the remedial
tracks should interact and suggesting that this gap may create room for litigation
reform arguments).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(A).
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designee.95 The ACA and its implementing regulations require that
all insurers offer internal review.96
Internal review can serve desirable ends. A genuine internal
process requires that the handling of a benefit claim involve more
than an unvarnished “yes” or “no.” Some procedure is specified, in
writing and ex ante.97 Adherence thereto is thought to encourage
faithful and fair evaluation by the insurer, and impress that
perception of fairness upon the claimant.98
Few contend that internal processes alone will ensure fair results
every time. Conversely, few dispute that for some number of
claims, internal review will produce the correct outcome; whether
that number is large or small depends largely on one’s priors.
Given the reduced cost of internal review compared to litigation, 99
one would expect there to be a sincere appetite by both insurers
and claimants for fair internal review processes.100 On the other
hand, if internal processes are not fair (relative to judicial review),
then the disadvantaged party will likely prefer judicial review, even
if it is more costly.
Recall that internal review is part of ERISA’s remedial scheme.101
Some claimant advocates have complained that internal review under
ERISA was not fair.102 Of the many opinions that were offered
95. In addition to “internal review,” I also occasionally use the terms “internal
process,” or “internal procedures.” All terms encompass both the initial claim and
any subsequent internal appeal. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b) (2013) (setting forth
the baseline federal regulation, referred to explicitly in the ACA, as governing “the
filing of benefit claims, notification of benefit determinations, and appeal of adverse
benefit determinations” (emphasis added)).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a); see also infra note 148 (describing the applicable
standards set forth in the implementing regulations regarding internal review). But
see infra note 127 (identifying types of insurance beyond the scope of this Article).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (describing the claims
procedure for beneficiaries and participants to recover employee benefits).
98. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 1005 (2010) (describing the fair “grievance
and appeals mechanisms” that the ACA intends to provide).
99. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining why internal review is
much cheaper than litigation).
100. Litigation is costly. But it is costly for everybody, because everybody has to
pay lawyers and devote resources to it, in one way or another. To the extent
litigation confers a substantive advantage on one party over another, that party will
prefer litigation. To the extent however, that litigation confers no substantive
advantage, then both plaintiffs and defendants will prefer less costly dispute
resolution alternatives.
101. See supra Part I.A (explaining that ERISA requires that all insurers provide an
internal review process to adjudicate employee benefits claims).
102. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 1340 (arguing that deferential judicial review
undermines the fairness of internal proceedings); Maher, supra note 33, at 673–76
(observing that, among other things, administrator bias results in unfair
administration of claims). One critic compared internal review under ERISA to a
“kangaroo court.” Joseph F. Cunningham, ERISA: Some Thoughts on Unfulfilled
Promises, 49 ARK. L. REV. 83, 90 (1996).
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criticizing internal review,103 perhaps the primary criticism was that
the administrators charged with conducting ERISA’s internal reviews
were often directly or indirectly beholden to the party who must pay
on successful claims.104 Such actual or potential conflict might
imperil fair review. Other criticisms were that internal review
procedures often limited claimant ability to fully present their side or
were difficult to understand.105
The ACA directly responds to those concerns and attempts to make
Indeed, the current internal review
internal review fairer.106
regulations for self-insured and group health plans include all the
procedural protections the federal government previously required
of ERISA plans, as well as a handful of new requirements
promulgated in connection with the passage of the ACA.107 With
respect to individual insurance policies, the regulations regarding
internal review are even more stringent.108
B. External Review
External review is review done by a competent party unaffiliated
with either the insurer or the claimant, but who wields some

103. See, e.g., supra note 102 (describing commentators’ criticisms of the internal
review process).
104. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1126 (1988) (explaining that ERISA
“leaves the plan sponsor to pick the fiduciary and, if the sponsor pleases, to do it
from the ranks of management” and that “[s]ponsors routinely exercise this
authority”). More than two decades later, the problem remains. John Bronsteen,
Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in
the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297, 2311–15 (2008) (explaining how conflict
manifests itself across various payor-administrator relationships).
105. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 741 (2004) (noting that under ERISA,
there is no right to issue subpoenas and “rarely is there an opportunity to present
testimonial evidence and elicit cross-examination during the claim process”).
106. See infra notes 107–08 and accompanying text (describing the stringent
regulations governing internal review that aim to make the process fairer for claimants).
107. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(a)–(b)
(2013) (promulgating regulations for internal processes of self-insured and groupinsured plans). “With respect to internal claims and appeals processes for group
health plans and health insurance issuers offering group health insurance
coverage . . . section 2719 provides that plans and issuers must” abide by regulations
promulgated by Department of Labor. Group Health Plans Rules Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,209 (June
24, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 117).
108. Individual insurers must satisfy regulations promulgated by the relevant State
and the Department of Health and Human Safety. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg19(a)(2)(B); 45 C.F.R. § 147.136(a)–(b). Individual insurers must comply with
several “additional requirements for internal claims and appeals processes” relating
to appeals and notice record-keeping. 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,209, n.3 (discussing
additional internal review requirements for insurers offering individual insurance).
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expertise helpful in resolving the dispute.109 In theory, external
review is a cost-effective approach free of the potential conflict that
naturally menaces internal review.110 It presents, in some respects, a
middle ground between internal review and judicial review.
The ACA envisions and provides that external review will be
available to all insured persons, whether they receive insurance from
a self-insured plan, a group-insured plan, or have individual
coverage.111 The external review must be done by Independent
Review Organizations, who are to be randomly assigned to disputes
by regulatory officials, and who may not be otherwise conflicted.112
The cost of the external review is to be borne by the insurer, with no
more than a modest fee chargeable to the insured.113
External review is widely perceived as more attractive to claimants
than internal review, and the ACA’s embrace of external review is
commendable. External review is cheaper than litigation,114 and the
structural risk of bias is much less than with internal review.115 On
the other hand, although external review resolves coverage disputes,
it cannot grant damages. Moreover, the specter of regulatory capture
exists where officials in a facially neutral government or governmentsponsored body subtly favor the regulated industry over the protected

109. See infra note 112 and accompanying text (describing the qualifications for
Independent Reviewers conducting external review).
110. Bronsteen, Maher & Stris, supra note 104, at 2324 (observing that impartial,
third-party administrative review is a low-cost alternative to litigation that combats
opportunistic insurer behavior).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b) (mandating that group health plans and insurance
issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage implement an
external review process).
112. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(vii)–(ix).
The Independent Review
Organization (IRO) specifics for self-insured plans are slightly different, but can
largely be ignored for the purposes of this Article. See Group Health Plans and
Health Insurance Issuers: Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and
External Review Processes, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,210–11 (June 24, 2011) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (explaining the IRO process for self-insured plans). I
do pause to note, however, that as the regulations currently read, the IRO process for
self-insured plans apparently contemplates random assignment from a list of external
reviewers the employer has contracted with (which must be no less than three), see
infra note 166, whereas state external review processes contemplate random
assignment of external reviewers from a list compiled by the state. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(vii). The former may represent an avenue for manipulation
of the external review process.
113. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(iv).
114. See Bronsteen, Maher & Stris, supra note 104, at 2324 (noting that litigation is
nothing more than a very expensive, very time-consuming process, whereas external
review is significantly more attractive because it is expedient and inexpensive).
115. See id. at 2324–26 (explaining that external review significantly diminishes
agency risk because the agent’s discretion for opportunistic behavior is
circumscribed by the determinations of an impartial reviewer).
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consumer. Just the same, one would expect there to be a significant
appetite by claimants for an external review option.
C. Judicial Review
Judicial review is what it sounds like: litigation, where a federal or
state court entertains an insured’s denied-coverage claim.116 The
central component of judicial review is a cause of action, i.e., a legal
right to relief that arises from some applicable body of substantive law
given certain conditions. Without a cause of action—the core of
traditional remedy—there is nothing for a court to review.
Importantly, the ACA does not provide a cause of action to remedy
a coverage denial.117 Instead, a claimant has the right to bring suit
under whatever law, pre-ACA, governed the insurance policy his
claim arises under.118 Figuring that out, unfortunately, necessitates
an understanding of ERISA preemption, because the two bodies of
law potentially applicable to a coverage denial prior to the ACA’s
enactment were ERISA and state law.119
116. By judicial review, I stress that I simply mean litigation; not that a judge
(rather than a jury) will decide the case. Even when a jury decides, the judge still
presides; hence, there is judicial review.
117. The ACA does not provide an explicit cause of action for coverage disputes.
Nor does it seem at all likely that it creates an implied right of action for coverage
denials, and I therefore assume it does not throughout. See generally Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (setting forth a four-part test to determine whether a statute
impliedly creates a cause of action consisting of an analysis of the protected class,
legislative intent, underlying statutory purpose, and traditional state law). The
Supreme Court has made clear that if a federal statute does not explicitly provide a
cause of action, the strong presumption is that no private cause of action should be
implied. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148,
175 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (remarking that the conservative justices are
hostile toward implied causes of action); ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER MAY, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS, 310 (4th ed. 2012) (“Courts have tended to apply
[the Cort v. Ash] factors with increasing stringency in recent years, reflecting a
judicial reluctance to imply a private right of action where Congress has failed to
provide one.”).
Indeed, with respect to certain issues other than coverage disputes, the Government
Accountabilty Office (GAO) has already opined that the ACA does not create implied
causes of action. “Congress directed GAO to consider whether . . . any guideline or other
standards under the 14 PPACA quality enhancement provisions identified in section 3512
of the law would result in a ‘new cause of action or claim.’” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, B-322525, CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT 1 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/B-322525#mt=e-report.
The GAO answered negatively. Id.; see also 156 CONG. REC. H1,857 (daily ed. March
21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (rejecting the notion that bills that would
become the ACA “may be interpreted or construed as creating a new cause of action
or claim or would modify or impair existing state medical malpractice laws”).
118. I consider the possibility that the ACA “extinguishes” the pre-existing right of
insured persons to bring a cause of action for coverage denial below. See infra Part
III.B.3. It does not. The state law analysis applies with equal force to ERISA.
119. Put differently, with respect to the available cause of action for wrongful
denial of coverage (and the damages recoverable), the ACA is a “pass-through”
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ERISA explicitly preempts all state laws that “relate to” employee
benefit plans.120 The broadness of that preemptive grant is lessened
by ERISA’s “savings clause,” which saves state insurance laws from
preemption.121 Nonetheless, the power of a saved insurance law to
regulate employment-based insurance arrangements is limited in two
important ways.
The first limit on saved state insurance laws is a provision in ERISA
called the “deemer” clause.122 ERISA bars states from directly regulating
employment benefit plans by the expedient of deeming them to be
insurers subject to saved insurance law.123 A state may, however, regulate
an insurance company that provides a group policy to a benefit plan.
Thus if Company Benefit Plan A engages Insurance Company B to issue
group health coverage for company employees, a state can regulate
Insurance Company B by way of “saved” insurance laws.124
The second limit on saved insurance laws is conflict preemption. If
a state law—even a saved one—conflicts with ERISA’s purpose, it will
be preempted.125 The Supreme Court has not been clear on the
complete set of saved state laws that are conflict-preempted, but it has
held that state laws providing additional causes of action or damages
beyond those provided by ERISA are conflict-preempted.126
The upshot is that the unusual mechanics of ERISA preemption
mean that the cause of action and damages that an insured is entitled
to depends on the nature of the insurance arrangement he is party

statute that relies on the previously applicable body of substantive law. See Brendan
S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1773 (2011) (“The
ACA uses federal power to create a legal meta-structure in which individuals can
plausibly ‘opt-in’ to either federal (specifically ERISA) or state law governing their
health bargains.”).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (providing that ERISA “shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan”).
121. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
122. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
123. Id.
124. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64 (1990) (“Our interpretation of the
deemer clause makes clear that if a plan is insured, a State may regulate it indirectly
through regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance contracts; if the plan is
uninsured, the State may not regulate it.”).
125. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1979–85 (2011)
(notwithstanding the savings clause preserving certain state laws from express
preemption, state law might still be preempted if it conflicted with federal law);
Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002) (explaining even
saved laws would fall to ERISA conflict preemption); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (holding that ERISA was intended to be the exclusive civil
enforcement vehicle for ERISA-plan participants and state cause of action claims
are therefore preempted).
126. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 55 (analogizing the Labor Management Relations
Act’s preemption of state law causes of action to the preemptive scope of ERISA).
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to. The three pertinent types are (1) self-insured plans, (2) groupinsured plans, and (3) individual insurance.127
Self-insured plans (employer-based). A so-called “self-insured plan” is
where the employer directly pays for employees’ incurred health care
costs.128 In that instance, because of the deemer clause,129 the plan is
entirely regulated by ERISA, including with respect to the cause of
action available in the event of a coverage denial.130
Group-insured plans (employer-based). A group-insured plan is my
functional term131 for a group insurance policy purchased by an
employee benefit plan for its employees. In that instance, because of
conflict preemption, ERISA supplies the cause of action available for
a coverage denial.132
Individual insurance (not employer-based). Individual insurance—
which is when an individual purchases a policy on her own—is
governed by state law and subject to state law causes of action for
coverage denials.133
D. Remedial Interaction and Litigation Reform
In a simple world, a legislature that contemplated three tracks of
review—internal, external, and judicial review—would specify how
these options were to interact. Alternatively, in the absence of its own
127. These three categories describe the overwhelming majority of arrangements
by which the non-elderly and non-poor receive insurance: through a traditional
private employer or via the individual market. Special cases, such as church plans or
multiple-employer welfare plans, are not here considered. “Grandfathered” plans—
which in some ways operate under the pre-ACA regime—are also not considered,
because it seems likely that few plans will retain “grandfathered” status. Elizabeth
Weeks Leonard, Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits of Grandfathering
Under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 756 (2011).
128. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 54 (1990) (stating that a self-insured
plan is where an employer satisfies its obligations to its participants without
purchasing an insurance policy from any insurance company).
129. The deemer clause prevents a self-insured employer from being deemed an
insurance provider. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2012); see supra notes 137–40
(explaining the effect of the deemer clause).
130. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text (explaining ERISA preemption).
131. Nomenclature for group health plans can get quite confusing. A self-insured
benefit plan and a benefit plan that obtains group coverage are both, conceptually,
“group health plans.” But because self-insured plans have a special regulatory status
under ERISA and ACA, one must be careful to distinguish between a self-insured
group plan and a group plan that buys group coverage for its employees from an
insurance company. To easily distinguish those two situations, I call the latter
arrangement a “group-insured plan.” Throughout, I use that convention and point
out whether the statutes or regulations use different terminology that might confuse
the reader. See infra note 181 (discussing formal nonmenclature of the ACA).
132. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship
between causes of action and ERISA preemption).
133. ERISA governs employee benefit plans. Individual insurance purchases are
outside the scope of its coverage.
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resolution of the matter, the enacting legislature would specify which
regulator was to decide the issue. Although the ACA suggests
answers, it falls short of lapidary precision. That feature of the
legislation provides various footholds for litigation reform battles to
be fought.
To see why, assume for the sake of argument that background law
permits only one remedial option in connection with an insurance
denial: litigation. If another remedial option is added, such as
internal review, whether that addition qualifies as litigation reform
depends on the terms of the internal review. If the internal review is
fair and optional, it does not qualify as litigation reform,134 because it
did nothing to reduce a claimant’s ability to obtain traditional relief.
If, however, the internal review is bound up with a rule that limits the
claimant’s ability to seek judicial review or the court’s ability to conduct
a full and fair review, then it qualifies as litigation reform. So it goes
with any rule that subordinates a strong remedy to a weaker one.
The ACA is susceptible to arguments that non-judicial remedies
trump judicial ones. Whether these arguments have merit is another
question, but, as they were with respect to ERISA, they will be made.
Moreover, because the ACA does not in all instances clearly specify
who decides remedy questions, litigation reform efforts will be
directed at regulators perceived as welcoming. These efforts will
come packaged in an analysis that insists such regulator was the
precise authority the ACA envisioned to address itself to that task.
III. ACA LITIGATION REFORM BATTLES: REALISM AND SPECIFICS
This Part accomplishes three things: first, it considers the degree
to which the extra-statutory influences that molded ERISA are still
present; second, it analyzes the ACA and its implementing
regulations at a granular level, with the aim of highlighting, for each
type of insurance, specific litigation reform battles likely to consume
judicial time; third, it readies the stage for a broader appraisal in Part
IV. Part IV examines “themes” one can expect litigation reformers
and their opponents to sound in furtherance of the particular battles
here predicted or in connection with others that the fog of regulatory
settling make difficult to predict.

134. As I mentioned at the beginning of the Article, litigation reform could
technically mean reform in either direction, i.e., reform that helped defendants or
plaintiffs. In reality, it means reforms designed to aid defendants. See supra note 1.
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A. Realist Influences Reconsidered

In Part I.C., I described three non-legal influences that drove
judicial interpretation of ERISA: (1) concerns over the high cost of
health care, (2) worry about the lack of a suitable alternative to
employment-based health insurance, and (3) a profound skepticism
toward the utility of remedy in general. To what extent do any of
these constitute meaningful forces today?
Insurance alternatives reconsidered. The concern that the ACA
ameliorates most is fear over a lack of alternatives to employmentbased insurance. Prior to enactment of the ACA, if an employer
chose not to offer insurance, the result would be that a significant
number of its employees would be unable to obtain affordable
insurance elsewhere.135 Moreover, employers are not in the business
of insurance; an employer’s core competence relates to the product
or service that the business sells to its customers. The farther away a
particular task is from a business’s core competency, the less likely
the business will be willing to perform that function, to the extent it
has a choice to do otherwise. Thus, even slightly volatile or costly
rules of remedy might deter employers from offering insurance, and
concomitantly swell the ranks of the uninsured. The ACA changes
this calculus by penalizing large employers that fail to offer
insurance136 and by opening up the individual market to everyone.137
There should be less of a genuine concern that more protective rules
of remedy will result in individuals being uninsured.138
135. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (noting outside of group insurance
coverage, insurance is very expensive and out of reach for many individuals).
136. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)(1) (2012) (stating that large employers will face a
tax penalty if they do not offer employee health insurance).
137. See id. § 5000A (mandating that individuals maintain minimum essential
health insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (prohibiting discrimination against
individuals based on pre-existing health conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 18001
(providing for immediate access to health coverage for uninsured individuals
with pre-existing conditions).
138. The concern that rules of remedy more expansive than those offered by
ERISA will drive insurance companies (as distinct from employers) from the market
remains. Unlike employers, insurance companies are in the business of insurance.
Accordingly, that rules of remedy (within reason) will meaningfully discourage
insurance companies from offering health insurance is a concern that applies with
less force against insurers than employers. Insurers will object, predictably and
perhaps understandably, but there is comparatively less of a chance that health
insurance companies will en masse leave the business absent the protections of, say,
judicial deference and a complete bar on consequential damages. Although
insurance company flight is less of a risk than employer flight, some sitting judges
may, nonetheless, believe insurance company flight is a strong and undesirable
possibility. Cf. George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (1987) (mentioning one early 1980s theory that rising insurance
premiums were attributable in part to the expansion of corporate liability, causing,
among other things, insurers to leave markets).
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Judicial hostility reconsidered. Judicial hostility to remedy remains,139
although perhaps it is subsiding as more appointees of Democratic
presidents take the bench, gain influence among their peers, and
ascend to federal appellate courts.140 For example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, long unfavorable to plaintiffs, has in
recent years seen its composition change, and is perceived as more
neutral than in years past.141 The point should not be overstated.
The collective federal appellate bench is not teeming with judicial
friends of the wronged. And most importantly, the Supreme Court
remains skeptical of the attractiveness of judicial resolutions, in
ERISA and elsewhere.142 The high court exerts more gravity on the
question of remedy than any other body.
Health care costs reconsidered. Of greatest concern is that the rising
cost of health care remains unsolved. Although there have been
some favorable reports of a slowing of the increase in health care
costs,143 the ACA failed to deal with a central cost problem associated
with the provision of medical care, namely that medical care is
provided through insurance, and health insurance promises hinge
upon “medical necessity” with no limitation as to the marginal cost of
139. See supra notes 85–86 (describing judicial hostility toward litigation and
skepticism toward broad court remedies).
140. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (noting the rise of Obama
appointees in the federal courts).
141. I base this observation on a series of personal conversations with private and
government lawyers who practice in the Fourth Circuit. That President Obama has
appointed six judges to that circuit court of appeals is also, of course, relevant to changing
perceptions.
See Obama Judicial Confirmation Statistics, JUDICIALNOMINATION.ORG,
http://judicialnominations.org/statistics (last visited January 12, 2014) (listing President
Obama’s six Fourth Circuit nominations made during his presidency to date).
142. See supra note 4 (noting the significant decisions by the Roberts Court that
have limited a plaintiff’s ability to bring and win cases); see also Adam Liptak,
Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-supremecourt.html?pagewanted=all (citing Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1449 (2013),
when describing the Roberts Court as limiting plaintiff rights in furtherance of a probusiness agenda).
143. See, e.g., Anne B. Martin, et al., National Health Spending in 2012: Rate of
Health Spending Growth Remained Low for the Fourth Consecutive Year, 33 HEALTH AFF.,
no. 1, 2014 at, 67 (summarizing the results of a study conducted by the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) showing an increase of only 3.7% in health
care expenditures, the fourth consecutive year of low growth); Jeanne Lambrew, New
Report Shows 2012 Continued Trend of Slow Growth in Health Care Spending, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Jan. 6, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/01/06/newreport-shows-2012-continued-trend-slow-growth-health-care-spending (reporting on
the CMS study, noting that 2009–2012 saw the slowest growth in health care
expenditures since the 1960s); see also COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH & THE ROLE OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACt 1 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
/files/docs/healthcostreport_final_noembargo_v2.pdf (concluding that “real per
capital health care spending has grown at . . . the lowest rate on record”).
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the necessary treatment.144 Until that matter is decisively addressed,
the economic pressure on health care costs will remain strong.145
The consequence will be that fears of cost will be lurking in the
minds of judges everywhere, supplying a strong temptation to trim
health insurance remedies to save pennies even as the legislature has
dodged the question of pounds.146
A fair presumption is that the foregoing extra-statutory concerns—
diminished relative to ERISA, but not weakened so much as to fade
into insignificance—will influence judicial interpretation of the ACA,
both with respect to the content of the law itself and the degree to
which judges will be willing to interpret it to prevent states from
pursuing policies that thwart or undo litigation reform. One cannot
exactly weigh the strength of these extra-statutory forces, nor predict
precisely how they will guide decisional law interpreting the ACA.
But it would be unwise to forget them when considering the specific
and thematic analysis that follows in Part III.B and C.
B. Litigation Reform Specifics
As explained above, for regulatory purposes, the three relevant
types of insurance arrangement are self-insured plans, groupinsured plans, and individual insurance policies.147 In this Part, I
explain how regulatory power regarding remedy is allocated with
respect to each type of insurance arrangement and suggest likely
battles over rule content.

144. See Maher & Stris, supra note 44, at 462 (noting that there is upward cost
pressure on the health insurance promise and uncertainty associate with that
promise because it does not explicitly include a marginal cost limitation and often
results in promisees being denied claims for medical care).
145. See id. at 462–63 (explaining that the lack of a marginal cost limitation results
in “relentless upward cost pressure” because patients, doctors, and entrepreneurs are
incentivized to make decisions “without regard for cost-adjusted utility”); cf. Pauly,
supra note 74, at 535–36 (explaining how moral hazard drives up price of health
care); Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2009)
(Magazine) (explaining how marginal value of treatments must be considered to
arrest price increases). Two possibilities for bending the medical cost curve
downward are to incorporate marginal limits implicitly (through vast government
provision of health care), or explicitly, through incorporation of cost effectiveness
thresholds in private contracts of insurance. Both had and have vigorous critics.
The ACA does neither.
146. Limiting remedies will not meaningfully arrest the growth in health care
costs, any more than sturdy buckets could have “bail[ed] out the Titanic.” Maher &
Stris, supra note 44, at 464 n.147.
147. “Group-insured plans” is my term for plans using group insurance. See supra
Part II.C. The statute and the regulations distinguish between the plan and the
insurer, but not in ways that are important except in specific circumstances.
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1.

Self-insured plans
Self-insured plans remain exclusively subject to federal control.
Internal review for self-insured plans must comply with requirements
set out in the ACA itself and implementing regulations promulgated
by the Department of Labor.148 External review must comply with the
external review process promulgated by Labor and Treasury.149 The
cause of action for coverage claims against self-insured plans under
judicial review is provided by ERISA.150
Observation one. For self-insured plans, the ACA regulations and
technical releases apparently require an exhaustion of internal review
processes before a claimant is eligible for external review, a
convention which tracks ERISA.151
However, the ACA clearly
modifies the application of deference. External reviewers must
“review the claim de novo and not be bound by any decisions or
conclusions reached during the health insurance issuer’s internal
claims and appeals process.”152 This is significant because it means
148. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2) (2012) provides that “a group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group health coverage shall provide an internal
claims and appeals process that initially incorporates the claims and appeals
procedures . . . set forth at section 2560.503-1 of title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, as published on November 21, 2000 . . . and shall update such process
in accordance with any standards established by the Secretary of Labor.” The CFR
reference in the ACA refers to the regulations that the Department of Labor
formerly promulgated for self-insured plans under ERISA. The updated regulations
issued pursuant to the ACA more stringently regulate internal review procedures.
For example, they more carefully regulate permissible conflicts of interest than prior
regulations. Insurers “must ensure . . . [the] independence and impartiality of the
persons involved in making the decision.” 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(D)
(2013) (emphasis added).
“[D]ecisions regarding hiring, compensation,
termination, promotion, or other similar matters with respect to any [person making
a coverage determination] must not be made based upon the likelihood that the
individual will support the denial of benefits.” Id.
149. See Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and
External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,210–11 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 117) (“In the case of self-insured plans subject to ERISA and/or the Code,
a Federal external review process supervised by DOL and Treasury applies.”); see also
29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(d) (setting forth DOL requirements for federally
regulated external review process). The preamble to the regulations provides that
the DOL “would issue additional guidance on the federal external review process.”
DEP’T OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, INTERIM PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL
EXTERNAL REVIEW RELATING TO INTERNAL CLAIMS AND APPEALS AND EXTERNAL REVIEW
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2 (2010) [hereinafter
TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01], available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACA
TechnicalRelease2010-01.pdf. Additional guidance was set forth in a technical
release issued on August 23, 2010. Id.
150. See supra Part II.C.
151. See TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 4 (requiring that an
IRO need assess whether “[t]he claimant has exhausted the plan’s internal appeal
process unless the claimant is not required to exhaust the internal appeals process
under the interim final regulations”).
152. Id. at 5.
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that the Firestone deference insurers enjoyed under ERISA with
respect to court review—wherein courts needed to defer to the
findings of an internal reviewer—will not apply with respect to
external review. As a matter of ACA law, external reviewers may not
extend Firestone deference to internal reviews.153
Obviously the value of this development to insureds will depend on
the fairness and competence of external reviewers. Incompetent or
captured external reviewers will be no boon to claimants. But assume
external reviewers are competent and impartial. Insurers highly
value deference. Might insurers and litigation reform advocates
argue that judges, in adjudicating an ERISA claim for wrongful denial
of coverage, need only defer to the findings of the internal reviewer,
not the external reviewer?
The argument is clever. Only claimants can invoke external
review.154 Thus, all external reviews will occur after a no-coverage or
partial no-coverage finding by the insurer at the internal review stage.
If the external review finds coverage and the insurer pursues the
matter in court,155 should the court defer to the external review or
the original internal review determination?156 Similarly, if the
internal process finds no-coverage, the external review finds partial
coverage, and the claimant pursues the matter in federal court
seeking full coverage, which finding will federal courts defer to?
The answer depends, first, on which statute—ERISA or ACA—
governs the relationship between external review and judicial review.
Neither statute explicitly speaks to the question. Federal courts
would be obliged to engage in federal common-law making to fill in
the statutory gap.157 But which federal statute drives the analysis?
One argument is that ERISA governs because ERISA provides
the cause of action that triggers judicial review. The other
argument is that the ACA governs because it requires the very
internal and external review processes to which the judge might

153. Id.
154. The internal review is done by the insurer or its agent; seeking external
review of its own determination would be odd, to say the least. None of the relevant
regulations, either at the federal or state level, contemplate the possibility of an
insurer seeking external review because it is unhappy with its own conclusion.
155. But see supra Part II.C (describing limits on insurer cause of action).
156. In cases in which the external and internal review finds no coverage, who the
judge defers to is moot.
157. Cf. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S.
JOST AND ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 683
(7th ed. 2013) (discussing ERISA and ACA interaction and noting that “[t]he scope
of review of federal courts reviewing decisions of health plans (or of external
reviewers) is not, therefore, wholly clear”).
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defer. The ACA, so the argument goes, invested in itself the
ultimate say on deference.158
The answer is not clear because judicial doctrine on how to resolve
conflict between two federal statutes is not clear.159 The better
argument is that ERISA supplies the answer but is bounded by the
ACA. The cause of action being burdened is ERISA-created, and the
sensible assumption is that the prior source of law creating the cause
of action retains authority to resolve burdens on its use, unless a
subsequent federal statute clearly displaces it.160
The matter is complicated further by the lack of clarity regarding
how ERISA “handles” external review in the wake of internal review.
The doctrinal justification for allowing deference in the ERISA
setting is that the employer who creates and amends an ERISA plan is
akin to the settlor of a trust.161 Settlors have the ability to award
specified fiduciaries power to administer the trust, including
interpreting the trust documents.162 Such a process is thought to
favor the creation of trusts—or in the ERISA setting, benefit plans—
and so judges must defer to administrators to whom the settlor has
specifically awarded interpretative power in order to ensure the
frequent creation of plans.163 Under this justification of Firestone
deference, it would not be proper for a judge to defer to an external
reviewer because the external reviewer was not so anointed by the

158. The question is not easy as a matter of principle, policy, or politics. If the
ACA, by mere dint of statutorily supplying two modes of non-judicial review, also
contains the power to define the relationship between non-judicial and judicial
review (including by limiting the availability of subsequent judicial review), then such
implicit power might be used in the individual insurance setting to limit state judicial
review of a state claim. Cf. infra Parts III.B.3, IV.C (examining the review processes
for individual insurers and an anti-judicialism view of the ACA).
159. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text (discussing court canons on
federal statutory conflict).
160. I am not suggesting that the law creating the cause of action always or
entirely supplies the common law rules affecting use of the cause of action, just
that it makes sense here and probably often. Cf. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of
General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 538–52 (2006) (discussing how “policy
bundles” can determine, in a federal versus state context, which law affects a given
cause of action).
161. See Maher, supra note 33, at 680 (explaining how deference is justified by
describing the employer creating an ERISA plan akin to a “settlor” who, in a
common-law trust, may grant discretionary power to a trustee).
162. See Langbein, supra note 42, at 218–19 (citing trust law precedent from
Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 717 (1875), supporting judicial deference to trustees
exercising “discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they act”).
163. See, e.g., id. at 218, 221 (discussing the court’s holding in Lowry v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Ret. Plan, 865 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1989), that an administrator’s
determinations should be given deference when the trust instrument—i.e., the
plan—evidences the power of the administrator to “construe uncertain terms”
because “[d]iscretion is a touchstone of trusteeship”).
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settlor.164 The consequence would be that, although claimants may
choose external review, upon appeal to a court afterward, the court
must defer to the internal review conclusions rather than those of the
external review.
Such a rule would make external review effectively useless in every
case in which the internal reviewer and external reviewer differ.
Assume an insurer denies coverage and an external reviewer finds
coverage. If a court must defer to the internal reviewer absent
arbitrary and capricious behavior, then insurance companies will
appeal every adverse external review determination in order to secure
a more favorable standard of review. External review would undo no
more “wrong” outcomes than its absence. Given the ACA’s provision
for both internal and external review, that makes no sense.
Instead, ERISA should yield to the ACA with respect to the
treatment of external review by judges. The ACA bounds the inquiry:
judges must either review the matter (1) de novo, that is, without
weight afforded either to internal or external review; or (2) afford
weight to the external reviewer’s finding only.165 Whether judges
need do the former or the latter would be resolved by ERISA, with
neither option enfeebling the ACA’s external review provisions.
Incidentally, it is not clear whether, from an ERISA standpoint, a
judge should review external review de novo or with deference,
although de novo review seems more likely.166

164. Employers or insurers writing in discretionary clauses are acting as settlors
under current Supreme Court doctrine. Cf. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
Advisory Opinion No. 2003-04A, 2003 WL 1785266 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 26, 2003)
(explaining that discretionary activities relating to plan formation, as opposed to
plan management, are “settlor” functions and are generally not fiduciary activities
governed by ERISA).
165. Conversely, affording weight to the external reviewer’s finding does not
render internal review useless. For self-insured plans, internal review is required,
and in many cases a claimant will simply stop there. Vukadin, supra note 29, at 1204.
In other cases, external review will reach the same result as internal review, and thus
provide the same uphill battle in court that would have been the case pre-ACA. Only
when external review reaches a different result than internal review will internal
review’s weight be “diminished” relative to the pre-ACA world. See TECHNICAL
RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 6 (requiring plans to provide coverage if the
external review reverses the adverse benefit determination). One of the central aims
of external review, however, is to serve as a check on internal review. Necessarily the
expectation is that internal review is of diminished importance. Cf. Kenneth H.
Chuang, Wade M. Aubry & R. Adams Dudley, Independent Medical Review of Health
Plan Coverage Denials: Early Trends, 23 HEALTH AFF., no. 6, 2004, at 163, 163–69
(reporting the results of a study finding that 33% of internal denials in California
were overturned via external review).
166. The technical arguments each will make as to what ERISA requires will
depend largely on the degree to which, if at all, independent review organizations
that provide the external reviews are perceived as favoring claimants or insurers. For
example, the current federal guidance only provides that insurers contract with three
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Observation two. ERISA requires deference to internal review only if
the plan so provides.167 The ACA upends that rule with respect to
circumstances where a claimant has sought external review because,
as explained above, not doing so would render external review a
waste of time. But what of judicial deference to internal reviewers if
no external review has occurred?
Presumably external review is a choice; a claimant can seek it or
not, and in any event proceed with judicial review.168 If a claimant
does not seek external review, then the ACA provides no explicit
reason why a judge should not extend Firestone deference to an
internal review.169 The likelihood that a judge would therefore grant
Firestone deference to an internal review gives claimants an obvious
incentive to utilize external review. If claimants proceed right to
court after internal review, they face a Firestone obstacle.
The same goes if the claimant cannot seek external review because
the coverage dispute relates to a matter outside the scope of external
review.170 Presumably in that circumstance judicial deference will still
be due to the internal reviewer. In practice, we will likely see
protracted arguments about what type of dispute is properly
encompassed by external review regulations.
Already, public
comments from those in favor of litigation reform have persuaded
the federal agencies charged with writing the ACA’s implementing

accredited IROs. TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 4. Three might
not be enough to ensure true impartiality.
167. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (explaining Firestone deference).
168. The external review regulations for self-insured plans do not specify whether
external review is required before judicial review, or merely an option. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2590.715-2719(d) (2013); TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 2–3.
However, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 considers all types of non-judicial appeals of claims
denial beyond the internal review process as “voluntary” appeals. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(c)(3)–(4). This regulation was expressly incorporated into the ACA,
and the legislation’s subsequent implementing regulations incorporated its
requirements and added to them. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii). Moreover,
the federal external review process must be “similar” to the state external review
processes the ACA contemplates, and the NAIC-UERMA assumes external review is a
choice. See infra notes 234–38 and accompanying text. Finally, should an internal
review process violate federal regulations, then the regulations explicitly provide that
an insured may pursue external or judicial review.
29 C.F.R. § 2590.7152719(b)(2)(ii)(F)(1). Nothing in the statute, legislative history, or implementing
regulations suggest that a choice between external or judicial review is not available
to claimants merely because an insurer complied with all internal review regulations.
169. Whether it implies a reason I leave to the reader. See infra Part IV.A
(discussing the flexible nature of jurisprudential devices concerning preemption and
federal statutory conflict).
170. External review is available based on the plan’s requirements for “medical
necessity, appropriateness, health care setting, level of care, or effectiveness of a
covered benefit.” 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(i).
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regulations to, at least temporarily, modestly restrict the scope of
external review coverage.171
Observation three. There is a final, technical wrinkle that will catch
some self-insured plans unawares. Assume during internal review the
plan denies coverage, but on external review coverage is found. Can
the plan appeal the matter to court?172
The ACA does not create a cause of action for coverage disputes
for either insureds or insurers.173 Self-insured plans’ available causes
of action are governed by ERISA.174 The hitch is that ERISA does not
provide an insurer with an § 1132(a)(1)(B) “coverage dispute” cause
of action; that remedy is only available to beneficiaries.175 An insurer
must articulate a claim under one of ERISA’s other remedial
provisions to appeal an external review finding.
Plans almost certainly will invoke § 1132(a)(3). That provision of
ERISA, which authorizes “appropriate equitable relief,”176 has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to supply only those remedies
“typically” cognizable in pre-merger equity.177 The Court, however,
has read equitable history to find that plans may secure equitable
relief through the expedient device of a “lien by agreement.”178 Lien
by agreement was an equitable device used to recover monies
promised by prior agreement.179 Plan drafters currently use the “lien
by agreement” mechanism to write clauses into plans that effect,
essentially by contract, expansive recovery and preference rights for

171. Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and
External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,216 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 117) (explaining that public commentary led the Departments to “narrow
the scope” of claims eligible for federal external review).
172. This will also affect group-insured plans, because the remedies there are supplied
by ERISA. See supra Part II.C (explaining how ERISA supplies the cause of action for
coverage denials under group-insured plans because of conflict preemption).
173. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that the ACA does not
explicitly create a cause of action, nor is it likely that an implied right of action exists).
174. Supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
175. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012) (“A civil action may be brought . . . by a
participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan . . . .” (emphasis added)).
176. Id. § 1132(a)(3).
177. E.g., CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011) (quoting Sereboff v.
Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361 (2006)); see also Great-West Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (discussing historical equity test); Mertens
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (creating historical equity test).
178. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1546 (2013) (“US
Airways . . . is seeking to enforce the modern-day equivalent of an ‘equitable lien by
agreement.’ And that kind of lien . . . both arises from and serves to carry out a
contract’s provisions.”).
179. See, e.g., id. at 1545 (acknowledging US Airways’s right to seek funds promised
under a contract through an equitable lien by agreement).
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plans vis-à-vis insureds.180 Smart self-insurers will rewrite their plans
to include lien by agreement rights against insureds to challenge
unfavorable external review results in court. Whether and how
exactly the lien by agreement device can be used on this question is
unsettled, and there will be litigation over the details.
2.

Group-insured plans
Group insurers must abide by internal review requirements
promulgated by the Department of Labor.181 In contrast, with respect
to external review, group-insured plans must comply with state law,
with one key exception.182 If the applicable state law does not meet
or exceed the consumer protections set forth in the Uniform Health
Carrier External Review Model Act (“NAIC-UERMA” or “the Model
Act”),183 which was promulgated by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, then the insurer in question must comply
with a federal external review process promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).184 Because of
180. See generally id. (permitting insurers to write in subrogation provisions that
override both the “common fund” and “double recovery” equitable limits on
subrogation recoveries by insurers); see also Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak,
Understanding and Problematizing Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 49,
81–85 (2008) (describing the “lien by agreement” mechanism, which permits
insurers to effectively seek contractual subrogation against an insured—i.e., “any
recovery from the tortfeasor will be diminished by the reimbursement of medical
expenses advanced by the insurer”—and noting that “virtually all modern policies
have subrogation provisions, many of which are of the first-dollar recovery variety”).
Critics of the Court’s “lien by agreement” jurisprudence, including myself, worry that
it supplies insurers with a contractual blank check against insureds. See Brief for
Respondents at 36, US Airways, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (No. 11-1285) (observing that a “lien
by agreement” can be applied against property unrelated to sickness or accident,
such as “100 percent of any future inheritance received by the insured”).
181. The statutory language refers to “a group health plan and a health insurance
issuer offering group health coverage.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2)(A). A group
health plan includes a self-insured plan. See Group Health Plans Rules Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,208 (June
24, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 117) (explaining that the “group health
plan” includes both self-insured plans and plans using group insurers); see also id. at
37,208 n.1 (“The term ‘group health plan’ is used in title XXVII of the PHS Act, part
7 of ERISA, and chapter 100 of the Code, and is distinct from the term ‘health plan’,
as used in other provisions of title I of the Affordable Care Act. The term ‘health
plan’, as used in those provisions, does not include self-insured group health
plans.”). The Department of Labor was given regulatory authority over the internal
review processes for self-insured plans and group plans using group insurers (which I
refer to as “group-insured plans”).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b)(1)–(2).
183. UNIFORM HEALTH CARRIER EXTERNAL REVIEW MODEL ACT §§ 5, 8–10, 13, 17
(Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm. 2010) [hereinafter NAIC-UERMA], available at http://www
.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/externalreviewmodelact.pdf.
184. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,211 n.14 (explaining that the federal external review
process applicable in the absence of sufficient state law will be determined by HHS);
see also OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
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conflict preemption, the cause of action for coverage denials
occurring in group-insured plans is provided by ERISA.185
Observation one. The question of whether external reviewers must
defer to internal reviewers in the context of group-insured plans will
likely attract attention, for several reasons. First, it is clearly a matter
of state law. More specifically, the ACA adverts to state authority on
external review, assuming the state external review law exceeds the
“consumer protections” in the NAIC-UERMA:
(b) External Review—A group health plan and a health insurance
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage—(1)
shall comply with the applicable State external review process for
such plans and issuers that, at a minimum, includes the consumer
protections set forth in the Uniform External Review Model Act
promulgated by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and is binding on such plans; or (2) shall
implement an effective external review process that meets
minimum standards established by the Secretary through guidance
and that is similar to the process described under paragraph (1)—
(A) if the applicable State has not established an external review
process that meets the requirements of paragraph (1); or (B) if the
plan is a self-insured plan that is not subject to State insurance
regulation (including a State law that establishes an external review
process described in paragraph (1)).186

External review state laws do not have to be “like” the NAICUERMA; they just need to be as protective of consumers as it is. If
the state law satisfies that threshold condition, then the only
additional constraint is that the state law must actually regulate
external review.187
SERVS., TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR INTERIM PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW,
4–14 (2010) [hereinafter EXTERNAL REVIEW GUIDANCE], available at http://www.cms
.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/interim_appeals_guidance.pdf (setting forth
external review process for group-insured plans, and individual insurers, in states that lack
sufficient external review rules). State external review law can be insufficient because
it exists but lacks the consumer protections of the NAIC-UERMA, or because it does
not exist at all. Interestingly, in contrast to the technical guidance relating to
external review for self-insured plans promulgated by Labor, the technical guidance
for group-insured plans subject to federal regulation because of insufficient state
regulation (which is promulgated by HHS) does not explicitly require exhaustion of
the internal process prior to seeking external review. Compare EXTERNAL REVIEW
GUIDANCE, supra, at 5–11 (exhaustion requirement absent from HHS guidance), with
TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 4 (including a provision that an
IRO need assess whether “[t]he claimant has exhausted the plan’s internal appeal
process unless the claimant is not required to exhaust the internal appeals process
under the interim final regulations”).
185. See supra Part II.C.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b).
187. The federally defined consumer protective minimums are set forth in 29
C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2) (2013). The outer boundaries of the set of state
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The ACA supplies two limiting conditions on a state seeking to
regulate external review: (1) state rules must satisfy a federally
defined consumer-protective minimum and (2) the rules must be
“about” external review. The latter seems so obvious as to not need
acknowledgement, but it warrants consideration. Note that from a
state regulator’s perspective those two conditions are less onerous
than the following three: (1) having to satisfy a federally defined
minimum, (2) having to be about external review, and (3) having to
be “like” the NAIC-UERMA. The latter set of conditions arguably
imposes a ceiling on how pro-consumer a state can be, i.e., states
cannot be more pro-consumer than the NAIC-UERMA. The former
set of conditions does not. The former is the law.
For example, the NAIC-UERMA requires exhaustion of internal
review prior to external review, absent special circumstances.188
Unsurprisingly, requiring exhaustion of internal review is not a
minimum consumer protection.189 Accordingly, a state that otherwise
satisfied the consumer protective minimums could “legislate up”
from NAIC-UERMA and not require internal exhaustion with respect
to external review.
Federal law does somewhat limit state prerogative to insert
claimant-unfriendly provisions in its external review laws by requiring
that state law contain the “consumer protection” minimums of the
NAIC-UERMA.190 Interestingly, current federal regulations that have
defined the minimum “consumer protections” state law must provide
do not reference the provision of the NAIC-UERMA that forbids

regulations that are “about” or “actually regulate” external review is not clear.
Whether a state regulation falls within the ACA’s external review preemption carveout will be litigated, certainly with respect to state regulations insurers dislike.
188. See supra note 183, § 7(A)(1) (“Exhaustion of Internal Grievance Process[:]
Except as provided in subsection B, a request for an external review pursuant to
section 8, 9 or 10 of this Act shall not be made until the covered person has
exhausted the health carrier’s internal grievance process . . . .”). The NAIC-UERMA
referenced in the ACA was the NAIC-UERMA in effect on July 23, 2010. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2590.715-2719(a)(2)(viii).
189. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2) (listed consumer protection minimums
do not include exhaustion of internal review before external review); Cf. U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2011-02, GUIDANCE ON EXTERNAL REVIEW FOR
GROUP HEALTH PLANS AND HEALTH INSURANCE ISSUERS OFFERING GROUP AND
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH COVERAGE, AND GUIDANCE FOR STATE ON STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW
PROCESS 2 (2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/tr11-02.pdf (“If
exhaustion of internal appeals is required prior to external review, exhaustion must
be unnecessary [in certain conditions protective of consumers].”). For groupinsured plans, this clearly contemplates state prerogative bounded by a federal
consumer-protective floor.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b).
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deference.191 Thus a state could, under the current regulations,
“legislate down” and enact an external review statute that supplies all
the consumer protections of the NAIC-UERMA, but permits external
reviewers to defer to the findings of internal reviewers (or construe
the insurance agreement in favor of the insurer).
Observation two. A second interesting issue involves the NAICUERMA’s language on deference. The NAIC-UERMA provides that
external reviewers should exhibit no deference to the determinations
of internal reviewers.192
One may wonder whether the NAIC-UERMA requirement that the
external reviewer not be “bound” by an internal reviewer’s
conclusions or determinations absolutely bars deference. One
expects arguments from litigation reform advocates designed to
smuggle in some form of hidden deference to internal review,
perhaps an argument that, although external reviewers may not be
“bound” by what happened in internal review, they should attribute
extra weight to the results of the internal review absent clear
indication of malfeasance. Arguments may also be made over the
difference between the relevant federal and state regulations. Unlike
the federal regulations limiting deference, the NAIC-UERMA does
not use the word “de novo”; perhaps this difference means state
external reviewers can favor insurers.193 A similar argument might
urge that the NAIC-UERMA’s language forbidding external reviewers
to be “bound” does not prevent external reviewers from having to
honor, in the first, instance provisions in the insurance agreement
that require ambiguous clauses to be construed in favor of the
insurer.194 To be clear, I do not find any of the foregoing arguments
persuasive—the patent intent of the NAIC-UERMA as written is to
191. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(i)–(xvi) (required consumer
protections do not include a “no deference” rule), with NAIC-UERMA, supra note
183, § 8(D)(2) (no deference due by external reviewers to internal reviewers).
192. NAIC-UERMA, supra note 183, § 8(D)(2) (“In reaching a decision, the
assigned independent review organization is not bound by any decisions or
conclusions reached during the health carrier’s [internal claims process].”).
193. Compare id. (“In reaching a decision, the assigned independent review
organization is not bound by any decisions or conclusions [of internal reviewers].”),
with TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 4–5 (“A contract between the
plan and an IRO must provide the following: . . . [i]n reaching a decision, the
assigned IRO will review the claim de novo and not be bound by any decisions or
conclusions reached during the [health insurance issuer’s] internal claims and
appeals process.”).
194. For example, consider a provision providing that “the parties agree that the
meaning of this policy is such that is consistent with whatever interpretation is most
favorable to the insurer.” The question is whether the external reviewer would have
to interpret the meaning of the policy consistent with the expressed intent of the
parties by calling all close cases in favor of the insurer.
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provide consumers (at a minimum) with completely neutral and
impartial review.
States, however, can avoid such quarrels by adopting language in
their external review laws that more clearly prohibits deference owed
to the internal reviewer and otherwise forbids the insurance contract
to be interpreted under any standard less favorable to the claimant
than de novo. In other cases, state background law may be
sufficiently clear.195 Because the ACA contemplates state freedom
once certain protective minimums are met, those issues are questions
of law for the implementing state.196 Claimant-friendly states will
likely not only bar deference,197 but also require external reviewers to
follow contra proferentum.
Observation three. The provision of the ACA that adverts to state
power over external review processes is section 2719(b) of the
Public Health Services Act (PHSA).198 Section 2719 of the PHSA,
in turn, is part of the ACA that was directly incorporated into
ERISA.199 Thus ERISA itself now includes language adverting to
195. For example, consider Illinois. The general rule is that “provisions that limit
or exclude coverage are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and most
strongly against the insurer.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Glenview
Park Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ill. 1994). Contractual modification of that rule
in health insurance policies is barred. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 2001.3 (2010)
(“No policy . . . offered or issued in this State, by a health carrier, to provide, deliver,
arrange for, pay for or reimburse any of the costs of health care services . . . may
contain a provision purporting to reserve discretion to the health carrier to interpret
the terms of the contract, or to provide standards of interpretation or review that are
inconsistent with the laws of this State.”). Of course, even states that already follow
anti-deference principles as a part of their background law may wish to explicitly
incorporate them into their external review statutes.
196. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (outlining the flexibility afforded
to states implementing an external review process other than the NAIC-UERMA).
197. In a piece written prior to the promulgation of the ACA’s implementing
regulations, Professor Hylton concluded that states will endeavor to ban judicial
deference “in order to rectify the unfairness that Firestone deference could continue
to create for plan participants and beneficiaries.” Maria O’Brien Hylton, PostFirestone Skirmishes: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Discretionary Clauses,
and Judicial Review of ERISA Plan Administrator Decisions, 2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 25
(2010). Although Professor Hilton correctly guessed that ACA external reviewers
need not defer to internal reviews, id. at 19, Professor Hilton did not consider
(because that was not the aim of her article) how the ACA affected the relationship
between external review and judicial review.
198. Section 2719(b) of the PHSA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b) (2012).
199. The ACA added section 715(a)(1) to ERISA. ERISA section 715(a)(1)
incorporates by reference the requirements of PHSA section 2719, which is codified
in the ACA at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19. ERISA section 715(a)(1) is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185d. Section 715(a)(1) of ERISA now reads that “part A of title XXVII of the
Public Health Service Act [which includes the section of ACA adverting to state
power over external review] . . . shall apply to group health plans, and health
insurance issuers providing health insurance coverage in connection with group
health plans, as if included in this subpart [of ERISA].” Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 715, 124 Stat. 119, 270 (2010) (codified
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state authority regarding external review processes.200
The
consequence of this amendment of ERISA on its preemptive effect
is potentially quite significant.
Recall that under ERISA’s explicit, statutorily provided rules of
preemption, states could not directly regulate benefit plans.201
Because of the savings clause in ERISA, however, states could regulate
insurers issuing group coverage in connection with a benefit plan, by
means of “saved” state insurance laws.202 Such “saved” state power is
in turn limited by (implicit) conflict preemption, the scope of which
is not clear, but which at a minimum prevents states from supplying
group-insured claimants with state causes of action or additional
heads of damages.203
With respect to the regulation of external review, one sensible way
to read ERISA section 715(a)(1) is that it now permits states to
entirely bypass ERISA’s explicit preemption provisions.204 In the
at 29 U.S.C. § 1185d(a)). The language of the ERISA amendment is very strong—it
even permits, on its face, direct state regulation of group health plans. They apparently
no longer have to resort to the expedient of regulating group insurers.
200. Cf. Vukadin, supra note 29, at 1212 (asserting that the “[]ACA also amended
ERISA to make clear that ERISA plans are also bound by the new external review
requirement”). The external review requirements are in large part defined by states.
Professors Vukadin and Jost, see infra note 204, are the only professors to have
considered the provision. No reported decision has done so.
201. 29 U.S.C § 1144(a)–(b); supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text
(explaining ERISA’s “deemer” clause).
202. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining contours of ERISA
preemption).
203. See Pathak, supra note 56, at 512–13.
204. The entire text of the relevant ERISA provision is:
§ 1185d. Additional market reforms
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b)—
(1) the provisions of part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act
(as amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) shall apply
to group health plans, and health insurance issuers providing health
insurance coverage in connection with group health plans, as if included in
this subpart; and
(2) to the extent that any provision of this part [7] conflicts with a provision
of such part A with respect to group health plans, or health insurance issuers
providing health insurance coverage in connection with group health plans,
the provisions of such part A shall apply.
(b) Exception
Notwithstanding subsection (a), the provisions of sections 2716 and 2718 of
title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act (as amended by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act) shall not apply with respect to selfinsured group health plans, and the provisions of this part shall continue to
apply to such plans as if such sections of the Public Health Service Act (as so
amended) had not been enacted.
29 U.S.C. § 1185d(a)–(b).
Litigation reformers seeking to preserve ERISA
preemption with respect to external review will likely argue that while section
1185d(a)(1) incorporates various sections of the ACA directly into ERISA, including
the external review provisions, section 1185(d)(a)(2) has the ACA affirmatively
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ACA, Congress has, in effect, withdrawn federal power to regulate the
external review processes (beyond setting minimums) and amended
ERISA to follow ACA. Accordingly, states would face no explicit
ERISA preemption regarding legitimate regulation of external review
processes. The practical effect would be that states no longer need
show that a law is a “saved” insurance law; they need only show the
law legitimately regulates external review, or so goes the argument.205
The effect that the ACA’s amending of ERISA has on ERISA’s
conflict preemption is even harder to discern. The Supreme Court,
however, has made clear that, as a general matter, external review is
outside conflict preemption.206 The ACA codifies that thinking;
indeed, the Model Act used by the ACA as a referent envisions
external reviewers supplying no Firestone deference to internal
overthrowing ERISA only with respect to Part 7 of ERISA, and Part 7 of ERISA
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181–1191c) does not include the ERISA preemption
provisions (codified at 29 U.S.C § 1144). Thus, the common law of intra-federal
statutory conflict would need to be resolved whether the ACA’s conferring of
external review power on states diminishes ERISA’s explicit preemption provisions.
There are at least two difficulties with that argument. First, it amounts to reading
the section 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b)(1) of the ACA as conferring upon states no
additional power to regulate external review beyond that which ERISA already
permits. Second, ERISA itself has a provision denying it the power to “supersede any
law of the United States . . . or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.” 29
U.S.C. § 1144(d). But see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493
U.S. 365, 375 (1990) (acknowledging 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) in another setting but
finding it inapplicable). The only other professor to have considered the matter
even obliquely is Professor Timothy Stoltzfus Jost. He reads the ACA to displace
contrary ERISA authority because it regulates “group health plans,” which includes
ERISA plans. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act: Regulatory
Gaps and Border Crossing Techniques and How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 27, 28 (2011) (reading section 1185d as “not strictly necessary, as the
provisions of the ACA on their own terms apply to group health plans, which are
defined to include ERISA plans”). In any event, it seems highly likely that resolution
of this question will depend in material part on realist forces. See supra Part IV.
205. Professor Jost may be alluding to this point when he reads the ACA to
collapse regulatory distinctions between “group health plans” and “health insurance
issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage.” Jost, supra note 204,
at 28. I say “may” because Professor Jost’s fine article does not squarely concern itself
with preemption or remedy.
I note as an aside that perhaps in part because of my views on the importance of
remedy, I may differ with Professor Jost on the degree of federalism the ACA
contemplates. See id. at 28 (concluding that “the ACA lays out a comprehensive
federal law framework for revolutionizing the underwriting practices of health
insurers, stimulating competition in the health insurance industry, and protecting
health insurance consumers” (emphasis added)). Cf. Brendan S. Maher & Radha
Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under
the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275 (2013) (arguing that the ACA possesses
considerable potential for states to exercise regulatory power); Brendan S. Maher &
Radha Pathak, Health Insurance & Federalism-in-Fact, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73
(2012) (same).
206. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002) (rejecting
the argument that external review procedures ran afoul of conflict preemption); see
also Pathak, supra note 56, at 511 (explaining Moran).
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reviews.207 Yet the relationship between external review and judicial
review is more complicated than that because it edges closer to
ERISA conflict preemption. Under the old jurisprudence of conflict
preemption, ERISA supplies the cause of action for a coverage denial
in connection with a group-insured plan.208 Presumably then, just
like in the self-insured context, ERISA would govern how judicial
review need treat internal review and external review, absent a
conflict with the ACA.
In the self-insured plan context, I argued that although ERISA
generally governed the way in which a court need treat internal or
external review, the ACA barred judicial deference to internal
reviewers where external review had occurred.209 The same applies
here with an additional twist. The ACA explicitly gave states the
power to control the external review process, and amended ERISA
accordingly. What occurs, with respect to judicial review, if a state
provides that external reviewers must follow contra proferentem?
Assume in such a state that a claimant loses an internal review and
then prevails partially on external review, appealing the matter to
federal court. Not reviewing the matter using a contra proferentem
standard indirectly frustrates the exercise of a state’s external review
power that the ACA specifically sanctions. On the other hand,
requiring that contra proferentem be applied by judges arguably
conflicts with ERISA’s remedial scheme (which permits contractual
modification of the review standard).210 The question will certainly
be litigated.
3.

Individual insurance
The ACA revitalizes (and swells participation in) individual insurance
markets; as a result the rules of remedy for individual insurance policies

207. Supra notes 187–95 and accompanying text.
208. Supra note 119–26 and accompanying text. I can see arguments that the ACA
might relax that somewhat, and provide room for very limited “supplementary”
causes of action or damages. But I think it is safer to assume, realistically, that ERISA
still supplies the sole cause of action for a coverage denial and preempts all state
causes of action and damages.
209. See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining, in “observation one,” the likely effect of the
ACA on deference).
210. As Professor Pathak has explained, the status of state laws limiting judicial
deference has not been conclusively resolved as a pure ERISA matter, independent
of any change effected by the ACA. See Pathak, supra note 56, at 502 (observing that
only three circuit courts of appeal have evaluated whether “state regulation of
discretionary clauses is preempted by ERISA”); see also supra Part II.C (discussing
judicial review under the ACA).
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will achieve much more practical significance.211 Interest in and
opposition to litigation reform will increase correspondingly.
ACA requires that all insurers offer internal review. Individual
insurers must comply with state law existing at the date of the ACA’s
enactment and with any standards adopted by HHS.212 HHS has
promulgated requirements similar to those of the Department of
Labor, with a few additional requirements specific to the
circumstances of individual insurance policies.213 As for external
review, like group-insured plans, individual insurers must comply with
state law, so long as state law satisfies the consumer protective
minimums.214 Unlike self-insured and group-insured plans, however,
the causes of action available to remediate coverage denials are
provided by state law.215
Prior to the ACA, federal power over individual insurance policies
was largely nonexistent. The McCarran-Ferguson Act216 provides that
federal statutes—unless specifically regulating the “business of
insurance”—do not preempt state insurance law.217 ERISA was an
example of a specific federal law regulating the business of insurance,
but ERISA is limited to employment-based insurance provided via a
benefit plan. It has no application whatsoever to individual insurance
policies. The ACA, however, does regulate individual insurance
policies, and this exercise of federal power will serve as the basis for
litigation reformers to argue that the ACA “implies” various litigationreform restrictions of state prerogative.
The consequence of the fact that state causes of action govern
coverage disputes for individual insurance policies is apparent.218 In
many states, insurance litigation rules are friendly to claimants,
including, in some cases, committing the ultimate crime of offering
211. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 20 tbl.3 (estimating insurance
exchange enrollment).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2)(B)(2012).
213. Compare 45 C.F.R § 147.136(b)(3) (2013) (outlining additional requirements
for individual health insurance issuers), with 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (establishing a
claims procedure under the authority of ERISA for group-insured plans).
214. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting the ACA requires external
review be made available to all insureds, including those with individual coverage).
215. See supra Part II.C (outlining the source of a claimant’s cause of action
depending on the type of insurance arrangement).
216. Pub. L. No. 79-14, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011–1015).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)–(b).
218. ERISA’s § 1132(a)(1)(B) cause of action for claim denial is quite attractive to
litigation reformers, for reasons explained in Part I.B. Thus, in the self-insured and
group-insured context, the temptation to argue that the ACA, by requiring internal
and external review, somehow conceives of a new remedial scheme that totally
extinguishes a claimant’s ERISA rights, will be comparatively small. But see infra Part
IV.B (discussing the anti-judicial review theme).
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the most industry-reviled feature of traditional relief: punitive
damages.219 The temptation for litigation reformers to argue that the
ACA extinguishes state causes of action, or severely limits them, will
be overwhelming.220
Observation one. I start with the most extreme argument: that the
ACA extinguishes state law claims and leaves consumers with only the
options of internal and external review. The ACA after all, does not
say that any cause of action, federal or state, survives as a third
remedial option.221
The statute and implementing regulations, however, offer no
support for the “extinguishment” argument. The legislation’s only
express acknowledgement of litigation reform is cabined entirely to
the creation of a grant system for demonstrative, pilot programs that
aim to offer suitable alternatives to tort litigation. Even that grant
system is clearly aimed at providing alternatives to litigation over
disputes more accurately characterized as being (or akin to) medical
malpractice, rather than coverage denials.222
As for the
implementing regulations, both ERISA and state claims survive the
ACA’s provision of internal and external review: the (1) NAICUERMA itself, (2) the list of minimum consumer protections state
law must have, and (3) the federal external review process all require

219. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 624.155(5) (2013) (authorizing punitive damages
against insurer); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (2013) (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23,
§ 9.1 (2013) (same); see also supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (noting
that insureds generally have more remedies available under state insurance laws
than ERISA).
220. Cf. Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 561 (1997) (explaining how frequently
“corporations have attempted to turn [federal] statutes from regulatory swords
into private shields”).
221. The House passed the “Affordable Health Care for America Act” (H.R. 3962)
on November 7, 2009, while the Senate passed the “Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act” (H.R. 3590) on December 24, 2009. The latter was the statute
that primarily became law. The House bill, H.R. 3962, did have a provision
guaranteeing that the Act did not extinguish prior judicial remedies. See Affordable
Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 232(e) (2009) (providing
that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed as affecting the availability of
judicial review under State law for adverse decisions”).
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a) (granting available to States “for the development,
implementation, and evaluation of alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving
disputes over injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care
organizations,” and “allows for the resolution of disputes over injuries allegedly
caused by health care providers or health care organizations; and . . . promotes a
reduction of health care errors by encouraging the collection and analysis of patient
safety data related to disputes resolved . . . by organizations that engage in efforts to
improve patient safety and the quality of health care”).
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that an external review decision is binding “except to the extent” that
other remedies are available under state or federal law.223
Additionally, nothing in the legislative history of the statute
supports extinguishment.224 Republican opponents of both the
House and Senate bills (the latter of which would essentially become
the ACA) repeatedly decried the lack of litigation reform in the
bills.225 Yet not a single speaker in favor of or against the bill that
became law applauded, attacked, or even mentioned any possibility
that the ACA would extinguish causes of action or judicial review in
the health insurance context.226
Indeed, given the statute, regulations, and legislative history, the
suggestion that the ACA extinguishes by implication any coverage
denial cause of action under state law (or for that matter, ERISA227)
borders on the frivolous.
I am mindful, however, of how
constitutional scholars confidently dismissed the merit of early
223. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719 (c)(2)(xi) (2013) (“The State process must
provide that the decision is binding on the plan or issuer, as well as the claimant,
except to the extent other remedies are available under State or Federal law.”); 45
C.F.R. § 147.136 (d)(2)(iv) (“These [federal] standards will provide that an external
review decision is binding on the plan or issuer, as well as the claimant, except to the
extent other remedies are available under State or Federal law.”); NAIC-UERMA,
supra note 183, § 11(B) (“An external review decision is binding on the covered
person except to the extent the covered person has other remedies available under
applicable federal or State law.”).
Also, the model notice for a final external review decision includes the following
language: “If we have upheld the denial, there is no further review available under
the appeals process. However, you may have other remedies available under State or
Federal law, such as filing a lawsuit.” Model Notice of Final External Review Decision,
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/IABDModelNotice3.doc (last updated
June 22, 2011). If the ACA extinguished post-external review judicial remedies, that
line would be superfluous. It does not, of course, imply that post-external judicial
remedies might not be modified.
224. Because of the unusual nature by which the ACA became law, it is difficult to
say precisely what is the “official” legislative history of the ACA. See John Cannan, A
Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative
History, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 131, 136–68 (2013) (explaining the complicated legislative
history of the ACA).
225. Virtually all of the talk running up to the bill was about medical malpractice
liability reform, which Republicans ceaselessly complained the health care bills did
not contain. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 29,590 (2010) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(“The reason why tort reform is not in the bill is because the people who wrote it did
not want to take on the trial lawyers.”); 155 CONG. REC. S13719 (daily ed. Dec. 22,
2009) (statement of Senator Vitter) (“Let’s pass tort reform and take all that
unnecessary cost out of the system.”); 155 CONG. REC. S13,811 (daily ed. Dec. 23,
2009) (statement of Senator Bond) (explaining that if a health care bill “eliminated
frivolous lawsuits . . . [the bill sponsors] could probably get 80 or 90 truly bipartisan
votes”). If the extinguishment of health insurance remedies were in the ACA, surely
that would have been mentioned in the back and forth between Democratic and
Republican Senators and Representatives.
226. See generally 155 Cong. Rec. S13,796 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009); 155 Cong. Rec.
S13,719 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009); 155 Cong. Rec. at 29,590.
227. Supra Part III.A.
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constitutional challenges to the individual mandate in the ACA.228
That confidence was misplaced; the mandate survived only on the
thinnest of judicial margins and only on tax, rather than Commerce
Clause, grounds.229 Although the extinguishment theory in my view
has no credible support in the statute, legal realism suggests that
sophisticated litigation reformers may rehearse the argument to
sympathetic judges.230
Observation two. Meaningful federal litigation reform does not
require that the ACA extinguish claims; the same end may be served
by reading the ACA to impose conditions that affect the availability or
scope of judicial review. Various versions of litigation reform
arguments along these lines are easy to imagine. A straightforward
one is that the ACA requires that either internal or external review,
or both, must be completed prior to state judicial review. Alternately,
the ACA could be argued to impliedly provide that the failure to
exhaust internal or external review negatively affects the scope of
court relief, the burden of proof, the available damages, or whether
the arbiter is judge or jury.
Consider a simple version of the argument. The ACA requires
all insurers to offer internal review, and imposes regulatory
safeguards to ensure internal review is impartial and fair. The
check on poor internal review is for external review to have
numerous features that ensure speedy and fair treatment of an
insured’s claims. Given that statutory approach, the argument will
go, clearly Congress intended judicial review as a last resort and
intended to preempt state law that does not sufficiently promote
internal and external review over litigation.231
228. As Professor David Hyman describes it: “Virtually all law professors who
opined on these issues agreed that all of the constitutional challenges to PPACA were
meritless—and the federal courts would make short work of the litigation.” David A.
Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits against PPACA?, 2014 U
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224364.
229. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012)
(upholding mandate on tax grounds); see also Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead
Hand: The Individual Mandate and the Zombie Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699,
1700 (2013) (explaining that the individual mandate in the ACA survived on tax
grounds, not on Commerce Clause or Necessary & Proper Clause grounds).
230. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?
Trend in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 668 (1993)
(noting legal realism views the courtroom as an “arena” where important policy and
substantive decisions are made that have a significant impact on litigation reforms
and their political impact).
231. To be sure, requiring a claimant to complete an internal claim process whose
contours are regulated by the government—and permitting a beneficiary to skip the
process absent the insurer’s strict compliance with those government requirements—
may well be reasonable as policy matter. Indeed, the more fair the internal process
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The plain language of the statute, however, is not friendly to this
argument. The statute does not require that either internal or
external review be anything more than an option. The ACA requires
that internal processes be “available,” and obligates insurers to
provide an internal claims and appeals process, but does not require
claimants to use those processes.232 Additionally, the implementing
regulations presume that the question of exhaustion of internal
review prior to external review is a matter of state law.233
Similarly, the NAIC-UERMA is on its face quite clear that external
review is an option, not a requirement. Section 2 of the NAICUERMA explains that the “purpose of this Act is to provide uniform
standards for the establishment and maintenance of external review
procedures to assure that covered persons have the opportunity for an
independent review . . . .”234 Section 3 in turn defines a “covered
person” as a “policyholder, subscriber, enrollee or other individual
participating in a health benefit plan.”235 Section 5 provides that “a
health carrier shall notify the covered person in writing of the
covered person’s right to request an external review . . . .”236 Section 6
requires that “all requests for external review shall be made in writing
to the [state insurance commissioner]” and that “a covered person or
the covered person’s authorized representative may make a request
for an external review.”237
Read plainly, the NAIC-UERMA—the model act the ACA assumes
states will follow—makes external review an option only a claimant
can exercise. In the alternative, the claim can proceed in state court.
Moreover, if a beneficiary chooses external review, although the
external reviewer’s determination is binding on both the insurer and
the claimant, NAIC-UERMA contemplates that external review is
is, and the more readily a beneficiary may seek outside review if the internal process
is suspect, the less of a remedial burden it becomes. Having a federally guaranteed
option to do so is certainly consonant with protecting consumers. Converting an
option into a requirement may also be defensible policy, if the internal review
process is cheap and impartial and thus saves money without sacrificing fairness.
And such arguments may apply with stronger force to external review, because there
is less of a risk of conflicted denials. But the question is not what is the best policy;
the question is what does the statute provide.
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(B) (2012) (referring to notice for “available”
internal and external appeals processes).
233. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(iii) (2013) (“To the extent the State
process requires exhaustion of an internal claims and appeals process, exhaustion
must be unnecessary [under certain conditions that favor the consumer].”).
234. NAIC-UERMA, supra note 183, § 2 (2010) (emphasis added).
235. Id. § 3(N).
236. Id. § 5(A)(1) (emphasis added).
237. Id. § 6(A)(1), (B). Elsewhere the NAIC-UERMA Model Act assumes that the
invocation of external review will be done by the claimant or her representative. E.g.,
id. § (7)(A)(1).

MAHER.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 2:41 PM

698

[Vol. 63:649

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

“binding . . . except to the extent [the insurer or the claimant] has
other remedies available under applicable State law.”238 Per the
specific language of the NAIC-UERMA, the availability and contours
of judicial review of coverage disputes on individual policies is left
entirely up to the states to specify; external review does not limit
court remedies unless the law of a particular state says so.239
Legislative history also undermines any theory that the ACA—by
requiring internal and external review be available—intended to limit
judicial review and concomitantly displace any state law that failed
sufficiently to do so. A Republican amendment to the House health
care bill prepared by Minority Leader John Boehner specifically
attempted to effect federal litigation reform by limiting judicial
review of “health care lawsuits.”240 Boehner’s amendment, which was
effectively health care legislation in itself, was entitled the “Common
Sense Health Care Reform and Affordability Act,” and in pertinent
part, envisioned a sweeping series of reforms that affected not just
medical malpractice, but all manner of health care litigation
including coverage denials.241 It provided that any “health care
lawsuit” would be subject to damage caps, voided joint and several
liability, limited attorneys’ fees, required clear and convincing proof
of malice to recover punitive damages, and excused from preemption
any state law that imposed greater procedural or substantive
protections for health care organizations (which included insurers)
than the Boehner bill.242 None of it was adopted.
Observation three. Insofar as federal power emanating from the ACA
trumps state power over individual policies, it does so as a floor. To
understand this observation, it is helpful to briefly offer an example
from the world of self-insured plans.
Self-insured plans are entirely regulated by the federal
government.243 On the matter of exhaustion, however, the ACA’s
implementing regulations effected a significant change compared to
238. Id. § 11(A)–(B).
239. Whether a state could, as a matter of state law, use procedural devices to
strongly favor external review over judicial review depends on whether a state
doing so would be offending the “minimum consumer protections” of the NAICUERMA. Supra Part III.B.2. The current interpretation by federal authorities of
the NAIC-UERMA minimum protections does not appear to bar states from
engaging in such conduct.
240. H.R. REP. NO. 111-330, at 85–91 (2009) (setting forth sections 301–310 of the
“Common Sense Health Care Reform and Affordability Act”).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 85–91 (setting forth pertinent provisions of Boehner’s amendment).
243. See supra Part III.A (explaining that the ACA incentivizes large employers to
offer insurance and opens up the individual market to everyone). The subsequent
analysis also applies to group-insured plans.
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the old ERISA rule. Claimants against self-insured plans now need to
exhaust internal processes only if such processes closely hew to the
extensive protective regulations governing the internal review
process. Indeed, originally the ACA regulations required strict
compliance by the plan with the internal regulations; absent strict
compliance, a claimant could proceed directly to external review or
judicial review.244 In the latter case, devastatingly for insurers, “the
claim or appeal is deemed denied on review without the exercise of
discretion by an appropriate fiduciary.”245 Firestone deference is only
due if a fiduciary has exercised discretion. Thus, under the
formulation of the originally promulgated ACA regulations, if selfinsured plans did not strictly comply with federal regulations on
internal review, they lost Firestone deference in court.
In response to industry criticism of Firestone deference being
conditioned on strict compliance, the Departments slightly revised
their rule on exhaustion.246 But not much. Under the rules currently
in effect, exhaustion is excused, and deference lost in court, if the
internal review process does not comply with the federal regulations
governing internal review, unless such infirmity is de minimis, not
likely to cause prejudice to the claimant, occurred for good cause and
in good faith, and was not part of a pattern or practice of violative
conduct.247 Although this is not the strict compliance the federal

244. “[T]he July 2010 regulations permitted claimants to immediately seek
review if a plan or issuer failed to ‘strictly adhere’ to all of the July 2010
regulations' requirements for internal claims and appeals processes, regardless of
whether the plan or issuer asserted that it ‘substantially complied’ with the July
2010 regulations.” Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and
Appeals and External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,213 (June 24, 2011) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 117).
245. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers
Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,351–52 (July 23,
2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (explaining that the initial July 2010
regulations required strict adherence to internal review requirements, and that upon
failure to do so, “[i]f a claimant chooses to pursue remedies under section 502(a) of
ERISA[,] . . . the claim or appeal is deemed denied on review without the exercise of
discretion by an appropriate fiduciary”).
246. Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and
External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,213 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 117) (“Consumer groups generally supported this ‘strict adherence’
approach, but the approach received a number of negative comments from some
issuers and plan sponsors, who advocate a ‘substantial compliance’ approach.”).
247. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F) (2013); see also 76 Fed. Reg. at 37 (“In
response to comments, the Departments are retaining the general approach to this
requirement, but this amendment also adds a new paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(F)(2) to the
July 2010 regulations to provide an exception to the strict compliance standard for
errors that are minor and meet certain other specified conditions.”).
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agencies originally required in the initial July 2010 regulations, this
effectively imposes a near-strict compliance standard on insurers.
Now the relevance to state prerogative can be explained. The ACA
regulates internal review for all policies, including individual policies
that are otherwise governed by state law. With respect to compliance
and exhaustion, the Departments could have left the treatment of
that issue entirely to the states to resolve on their own, but they
seemingly did not. Instead, the ACA regulations governing internal
review for individual policies provide that, absent near-strict
compliance with federal regulations, “the claimant is deemed to have
exhausted the internal claims and appeals process.”248
This appears to be an attempt to ensure that states eager to favor
internal review over external or judicial review cannot do so via state
doctrines of exhaustion that too readily overlook insurer violations of
internal review protocols. How robust this protective effort will be—
that is, how resistant it will be to state efforts to circumvent it—is not
clear. But the point is that, to the degree the ACA and its
implementing state regulations are displacing state authority, they are
doing so in a way designed to protect insureds.
It is not possible to predict precisely how extra-statutory impulses
might affect the specific analyses set forth above. Readers are invited
to speculate how the above issues and disputes might be resolved in
the real world, outside the pages of this Article. Nevertheless, certain
themes will serve useful in imagining how realist preference and
statutory interpretation coherently interact.249
IV. ACA LITIGATION REFORM THEMES
The analysis in Part III.B was, by design, rooted in specifics. It
aimed to provide academics, judges, regulators, and practitioners
with a functional understanding of the ACA on remedy as well as
some concrete predictions regarding the most likely litigation reform
battles. By contrast, Part IV steps back and considers “themes” likely
to be urged by litigation reformers and their opponents, either in
connection with the specific disputes identified in Part III.B or as a
launching pad for others.
For purposes of this Article, the notion of a theme is
straightforward. Put simply, it is a larger story on remedy supposedly
248. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F)(1)–(2) (setting forth limits on use of
exhaustion); id. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(iii) (explaining that state exhaustion rules
are subject to § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F)).
249. See infra Part IV (considering themes likely to be urged by litigation reformers
and their opponents).
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told by the ACA. While thematic descriptions of statutes have been
attacked as useless or harmful by various interpretative schools,250 I do
not discuss themes here solely as formal interpretative prisms by
which the ACA will be construed. I regard themes as an essential way
to understand the narratives litigation reformers and other
stakeholders will offer. The ACA is technical, complicated, and dry.
And humans (including judges) are not tireless propositional robots.
Narrative matters.
The use of themes in this fashion is particularly useful with respect
to a complicated federal statute like the ACA, one that affects both
federal and state law. As I explain in Part IV.A., the judicial device by
which conflict between federal and state law is mediated is well
known: “preemption.” The judicial means by which conflicts
between federal laws are resolved does not have a tidy name; I prefer
the term “intra-federal statutory conflict resolution.” Both doctrines
are fairly elastic and could serve as the hook by which the remedial
themes discussed below could appear in judicial and regulatory
interpretations of the ACA.251
A. Flexible Jurisprudential Devices
Preemption. Preemption is the doctrine by which the winners in
federal versus state law conflicts are chosen. Preemption comes in
two varieties: express and implied. Express preemption is when the
federal statute specifies the degree to which it does or does not
displace state law.252 The presence of an explicit preemptive clause,
however, does not bar judges from engaging in an analysis of

250. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In
Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (1996) (observing that textualist
judges “give little weight to the purpose of a statute, the intent of Congress, or the
current societal context in which the statute applies”).
251. Cf. Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of National Government: Justice
Stevens’s Stand Against Judicial Subversion of Progressive Laws and Lawmaking, 106
NW. U. L. 769, 772–79 (2012) (cataloging the methods by which conservative
justices have used “a broad selection of doctrinal monkey wrenches to throw into
the machinery of the modern progressive state” and “immuniz[e] businesses
from private remedies under federal and state laws protecting customers,
retirees, depositors, workers, and other individuals”).
252. Affirmative preemptive provisions are usually called “preemption” clauses.
Preemption provisions that spell out where state law survives are often called
“savings” clauses. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 727, 738 (2008) (explaining preemption clause nomenclature).
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“implicit” preemption.253 Implicit preemption occurs when state law
“conflicts” with federal law.254
Conflict preemption is often sub-divided into “impossibility” and
“obstacle” preemption.255 The variant of conflict preemption that will
be at issue with respect to the ACA is “obstacle” preemption—where
state law is preempted because it frustrates the “purposes and
objectives of Congress.”256 Conflict-obstacle preemption arises both
in respect to logically contradictory state laws as well as those that
hinder or obstruct Congressional purpose.257
The doctrine of preemption—and obstacle preemption in
particular—is quite muddled.
Facially neutral principles like
“formalism” or “textualism” do little work, even for those judges who
proclaim their merits.258 And the more extensive the list of contact
points between federal and state law, the higher the likelihood that
obstacle preemption will be wielded by “free-ranging” realist
judges.259 The ACA contains many contact points between federal
and state law.
253. See id. at 739 (referencing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861,
861 (2000), and stating that “the Court . . . has held state law displaced even when
the statute contains an express saving clause”).
254. Field preemption, a type of implied preemption, is when Congress so
thoroughly regulates an area that it “occupies the field.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good,
555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (“Pre-emptive intent may also be inferred if the scope of the
statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field.”).
Field preemption is extremely rare, though it has been applied to areas implicating
national security, such as atomic energy. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (applying field preemption
in the area of atomic energy); Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376
F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (same); see also Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539
F.3d 237, 243 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Courts rarely find field preemption . . . .”). Field
preemption is often (correctly) described as an area of implied preemption, see
Merrill, supra note 252, at 739, but it could be express: Congress could declare that it
intends to exclusively occupy a field.
255. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228–30 (2000). Impossibility
preemption is extremely narrow because it refers to physical, rather than logical,
impossibility. Id. at 228. Accordingly, “even if one sovereign’s law purports to give
people a right to engage in conduct that the other sovereign’s law purports to
prohibit, the ‘physical impossibility’ test is not satisfied [because] a person could
comply with both state and federal law simply by refraining from the conduct.” Id. at
228 n.15 (emphasis added). Impossibility preemption exists only when Sovereign A
affirmatively requires Act Z and Sovereign B forbids Act Z. Id.
256. Id. at 228.
257. Id. at 228–29.
258. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113,
114 n.5 (noting that preemption serves as an “exception” to the Court’s embrace
of textualism).
259. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 595 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(criticizing obstacle preemption as little more than a court’s “free-ranging
speculation about what the purposes of the federal law must have been”); cf. Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (urging restraint in implied
preemption analysis so as to avoid converting the doctrine into “[a] freewheeling
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The ACA incorporates some specific preemption provisions, but
none appears to directly address coverage denial remedies.260
Instead, state rules of remedy would be subject to the ACA’s general
preemption provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d).
Interestingly, that provision is facially written as an anti-preemption
provision: “Nothing in [Title I] shall be construed to preempt any
State law that does not prevent the application of the provisions of
this title.”261
The meaning of the provision is unclear and prompts the question:
why was it written in at all? The common law of conflict preemption
already displaces state law that (1) logically conflicts with federal law
or (2) poses an obstacle that frustrates Congressional intent. Does
Congress’s use of the expression “prevent the application” intend
something broader than, equal to, or narrower than the common law
of conflict preemption? Perhaps the latter. Obstacle preemption has
come under attack from both conservative and liberal scholars as a
thinly veiled means to instantiate judicial policy preferences.262
Perhaps Congress intended for § 18041(d) to curb, in some way, the
use of obstacle preemption by judges to displace state law. Yet
neither the height nor slope of the curb contained in § 18041(d) is
self-evident.
Intra-federal statutory conflict resolution. Scholars have often debated
how different types of federal law interact—for example, treaties
versus statutes, or statutes versus the federal rules of civil
procedure.263 However, there has been little scholarly treatment as to
how conflicts between federal statutes should be resolved. In the
judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
260. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15 (2012) (involving tort reform demonstration
projects); id. § 1320a-7h (involving physician transparency reports); id. § 18031(k)
(involving regulation of exchanges).
261. Id. § 18041(d). The statutory note makes clear that the reference to “this
title” is to Title I of the ACA. Title I added section 2719 to the PHSA, while Title X,
enacted simultaneously, amended Title I, including section 2719. The amended
language was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19. Some other preemption regulations
in the ACA track this language. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18054(b)(32) (tracking
preemptive “prevent the application” language).
262. “Commentators on the bench and in the academy have puzzled at the
seeming incoherence of decrying reliance on a statute’s background purposes but
finding state laws preempted as inconsistent with those purposes.” John David
Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 372 (2013); see also
id. at 372–73 n.9 (identifying a range of commentators who have criticized the
Court’s implied preemption analysis).
263. See, e.g., Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals
Analysis: A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and
Federal Rules, 51 EMORY L.J. 677, 701–26 (2002) (describing the resolution of conflicts
between federal rules of civil procedure and statutes).
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courts, various canons are invoked. Statutes should be read in
harmony where possible.264 Old laws yield to new.265 General statutes
yield to specific ones.266 Implied repeal is disfavored.267 Yet how
these canons interact, particularly when operating at cross purposes,
is not clear. Similarly unclear is how they apply with respect to ERISA
and the ACA.268
B. The ACA as Consumer Choice
The ACA as consumer choice is a theme likely to be invoked by
litigation reform opponents. The story will go something like this:
the ACA’s drafters intended to ensure that insureds had three robust
and independent options for remedy—internal, external, and judicial
review. The legislation says nothing about one remedy limiting any
other. Under this thematic approach, rules that in practice limit a
264. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (“The courts are not at
liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes
are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”).
265. See Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing the canon
as “[u]sually the older law yields to the newer”).
266. See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976) (“In a variety of
contexts the Court has held that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more
general remedies.”); see also Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980)
(referring to the “principle that a more specific statute will be given precedence over
a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence”); Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (noting the “basic principle of statutory
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not
submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum”).
267. See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 551 (“[S]ince we ‘are not at liberty to pick and
choose among congressional enactments . . . when two statutes are capable of
coexistence,’ . . . we must conclude that the earlier, more specific provisions . . . were
neither expressly nor implicitly repealed by the later, more general provisions . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95,
103 n.12 (1964) (holding that “[a]mendments by implication . . . are not favored”);
Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 US 497, 503 (1936) (explaining that “repeals by
implication are not favored”). But “if the later act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal
of the earlier act.” Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 154. And “[i]t is common ground, or at
least should be, that a later-enacted statute can confine the domain of an earlier
one.” Quinn v. Gates, 575 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2009).
268. The matter is complicated further by ERISA’s anti-supercession provision,
which provides that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend,
modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States . . . or any rule
or regulation issued under any such law.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (2012). The true
scope of this clause is unsettled. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 375, (1990) (finding 29 U.S.C. §1144(d) inapplicable);
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding
that § 1144(d) subordinates ERISA to the later-enacted Americans with Disabilities
Act). In any event, the same nonlegal impulses that may motivate judges to
expansively read ACA’s general preemptive provision vis-à-vis state law favoring
insureds could motivate them to find reason to hold 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) inapposite
in cases involving tension between ACA provisions favoring insureds and ERISA
provisions that do not.
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consumer’s choice to pursue one form of review will be argued to
have been impliedly displaced or preempted by the ACA.
To insist that insureds may choose which remedial track to pursue,
with no constraint, is admittedly a tidy view of the ACA on remedy. It
is also appealing because it errs on the side of consumer fairness,
favors individual choice, and encourages insurers and states to make
non-judicial review processes as inexpensive, competent, and
impartial as possible.269
The challenges of this narrative, however, are twofold. First, it
implies the elimination of settled ERISA doctrine. Recall that the
ACA does not undo the rule that exhaustion is required for selfinsured plans, nor does it explicitly end deference to internal
reviewers on matters outside external reviewers’ scope.270 The former
is expressed as a matter of agency rule, while the latter is a natural
implication of the regulations as written. Both clearly draw from
ERISA practice. Perhaps regulators could change course, or liberal
judges could reject agency regulations, with either bureaucrat or
jurist having become taken with the consumer choice theme. But I
highly doubt it.
I do not doubt, however, that a milder version of this consumer
choice theme will be urged, perhaps with ultimate success. The
milder version will go something like this: except where ERISA or
the ACA’s implementing regulations clearly indicate otherwise, the
presumption is that the ACA promotes consumer choice.271 This
theme implies that the specific dominates the general. Given the
current inclinations of the American judiciary,272 this theme seems
unlikely to immediately secure followers. In coming years, however,
the landscape may be quite different, particularly if there is a slight
change in the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court.

269. Individuals denied coverage are, with most claims, likely to want to obtain the
promised benefit as quickly and cheaply as possible. If internal review is truly fair—if
Insurer A has a reputation for fairly and promptly resolving disputes—that option
will be very often selected, and Insurer A will benefit compared to competitors
perceived as more sharp-elbowed and thus more often subject to litigation. Similarly,
if a state does a poor job of ensuring its external reviewers are truly impartial,
external review will attract a smaller audience, as it should.
270. See supra Part III.B.1.
271. So, for example, the ERISA plans’ ability to contractually modify policies so
as to alter background rules—which prior to the ACA’s passage, was presumed to be
fairly expansive, but was only confirmed in a few specific areas—would be, by dint of
the ACA’s purpose, now very much limited: contractual limit on consumer choice
would be presumptively disfavored.
272. See supra Part I.C (noting significant judicial hostility to expansive remedies
for plaintiffs).
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Although I believe comprehensive remedy is important,273 I must
admit that the ACA as consumer choice theme seems quite
susceptible to overreach. For example, the statute’s structure and
text seemingly preserve ERISA’s remedial approach in some
important—and, to me, disappointing—ways.274 More troubling is
that the “ACA as consumer choice” theme could supply insufficient
regulatory space for states to operate differing remedial regimes.
Ensuring pure option-choice can be costly, and some states might not
adjudge the benefits to be worth such costs. It is also possible that
some combination of the ACA’s three remedial options that falls
short of undiluted choice may yield the “best” results. While the ACA
does provide a protective floor regarding remedy, preempting all
state action that infringes upon the consumer’s choice regarding any
of the three options may pay short shrift to traditional federalist
virtues of experimentation and heterogeneous preference, and, in
any event, exceed the legislation’s intent.275
C. The ACA as Anti-Judicialism
An attractive theme for litigation reformers will be that the ACA is
generally hostile to judicial dispute resolution, by virtue of its
extensive regulation of non-judicial processes. The theme might
animate two approaches to reform: (1) to argue that the ACA
modifies ERISA so as to further diminish ERISA’s judicial remedies;
and (2) to argue that the ACA, by dint of exercising power over
individual insurance policies, preempts state laws that do not
sufficiently favor non-judicial review.
As to the first approach—reading the ACA to further weaken
ERISA’s remedial regime—consider the following. Through the use
of a series of judicial glosses, the Supreme Court has “interpreted”
ERISA as creating a mandatory administrative scheme to handle
coverage disputes.276 The ACA, in short, provides a much better
administrative scheme. It more strictly regulates internal review and
creates an external review system that, on its face, demands
273. On four separate occasions, I represented ERISA beneficiaries on the merits
as parties before the Supreme Court: Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
134 S. Ct. 604 (2013); US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013);
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010); and LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc.,
552 U.S. 248 (2008). I have never represented an ERISA plan, fiduciary, or insurer
in any capacity before the Court.
274. See supra Part II.C.
275. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4, 44–73 (2010) (describing the virtues of federalism).
276. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA as national
litigation reform).
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competent and impartial reviewers.277 It must, therefore, impose
even greater limits on the use of judicial review than ERISA does, or
so the argument goes.
I do not specifically see a path for this approach to prevail; I see no
identifiable place where the ACA modifies ERISA so as to further
weaken the judicial review of claims. That the ACA extinguishes all
judicial remedy under ERISA is, as I have explained above, utterly
unjustifiable.278 And I have, in the specific instances analyzed in Part
III, expressed skepticism that the ACA in any way worsens the ERISA
remedial regime.279 However, I cannot say that on this question the
text and regulations are so clear as to foreclose any possibility that the
ACA will be read as embodying this theme.
The second approach—urging the ACA as a limiting force on state
judicial remedies—is more troubling. ERISA will no doubt serve as a
point of reference. One might think ERISA would be readily
disregarded, given the difference in the preemptive structures of the
two statutes.280 ERISA expressly and presumptively preempted large
swathes of state law and also affirmatively provided a fairly detailed set
of remedies (although not nearly so comprehensive as later decisions
would pretend).281 The ACA does neither, and thus formally comes
with a much weaker and narrower preemptive base.
One would naturally expect that the preemptive “penumbra” of
ERISA, i.e., its implied preemptive reach, to be larger than that of the
ACA, just as larger objects cast bigger shadows. But it all depends on
the angle at which one shines judicial light on the statute. Tiny
objects can cast very large shadows if hit with light from certain
angles. Legal realism expects that judges will, for non-legal reasons,
move the light.
For example, converting the ACA’s federally guaranteed options of
internal and external review into an ACA command (i.e., that state
277. See supra Part II.A–B (outlining the internal and external review procedures
in the ACA).
278. Supra Part III.B.3.
279. See supra Part III. I cannot analyze every ambiguity or possibility, and perhaps
some overlooked statutory crevice could support a rule where, for example, in some
circumstances a judge acting in the aftermath of non-judicial review must offer
something exceeding Firestone deference. That is, a plaintiff might need to show
something more than arbitrariness and capriciousness before a court were permitted
to disturb the result of the non-judicial review. Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012) (setting
forth extremely limited grounds under the Federal Arbitration Act by which a court
may overturn arbitration award). Moreover, my analyses in Part III may be wrong at
the granular level. And, finally, even in those cases where a specific analysis may have
been “correct,” it may fall victim to realist impulses and themes.
280. See supra Part II.C (explaining the broad preemptions found in ERISA and
the narrow preemptions found in the ACA).
281. See supra Parts I.B, II.C.
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law governing individual insurance policies must make non-judicial
review a pre-suit requirement) is a trick ERISA already performed.
For the sake of comparison, remember that ERISA provides that a
claimant must have an “opportunity” to utilize a “full and fair”
internal claims review process.282 Nonetheless, that opportunity was
merrily converted by the judiciary into a requirement that a claimant
must use such a process before resorting to court.283
Admittedly, under ERISA the exhaustion requirement occurred in
part based on a misunderstanding of the statute’s relation to the
Labor Management Relations Act, which required internal grievance
exhaustion prior to suit.284 But just as in persuading judges to
interpret ERISA with an improper reference to the LMRA, litigation
reformers advancing an anti-judicial review theme might persuade
judges to interpret the ACA with improper reference to ERISA.
While ERISA constitutes still-controlling law with respect to key
aspects of the regulation of self-insured and group plans, it has no
controlling relevance whatsoever with respect to individual insurance.
Litigation reformers will urge that judges consider the “teachings”
of ERISA to “guide” interpretation of the ACA. For example, here
are the words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
uttered over thirty years ago, in justifying the court’s reading of
ERISA as requiring that claimants exhaust internal claim procedures
before seeking judicial relief: “It would . . . be anomalous if the same
good reasons that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to
require covered plans to provide administrative remedies for
aggrieved claimants did not lead courts to see that those remedies are
regularly used.”285 Precisely the same reasoning could be offered in
defense of reading the ACA to impose, via § 18041(d), limits on state
power. The steps are familiar: the ACA provides more reliable and
impartial means for non-judicial resolution of coverage disputes than
does ERISA.286 It should, thus, be impliedly read to ensure that states
cannot rob non-judicial review of the privileged position the ACA

282. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
283. But see Maher, supra note 33, at 674–76 (arguing that, as both a textual and
policy matter, it is unlikely that ERISA requires administrative exhaustion).
284. Professor Conison dismantled this argument over twenty years ago,
explaining: “the reference to section 301 of the LMRA does not mean that courts
should import into ERISA the specific rules that have been developed under
section 301. Neither the Conference Report nor any other document suggests that
Congress intended such a result or that such a reading of the passage is even
remotely plausible.” Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV.
1, 16–17 (1992).
285. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980).
286. Supra Parts I.A, II.
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takes pains to grant it. State law that fails to promote non-judicial
review will be claimed to “prevent the application” of the ACA’s
provisions insofar as it frustrates an asserted Congressional purpose
of “maximizing” use of internal and external review.
With respect to individual policies, consider a state’s failure to
require the exhaustion of external review before judicial review, or a
state’s choice to judicially resolve coverage disputes with no
deference owed to external review. Neither squarely prevents the
application of any provisions of the ACA. After all, the legislation
explicitly and affirmatively codifies state prerogative regarding
external review, and the cause of action in question is created by state
law.287 Given that external review and the cause of action that leads
to judicial review are both subject to state law, the relationship
between external review and judicial review seems necessarily, by
design, entirely a matter of state law. But, after reading into the ACA
an implicit Congressional purpose that the use of non-judicial review
should be maximized, ACA’s general preemption clause could serve
as the statutory ledge upon which reformers may seek to divest states
of external review authority.
Consider also internal review. Regarding internal review, the ACA
uses a more traditional approach to regulating state power; it adopts
existing standards and directs federal agencies to further update such
standards.288 Unlike with respect to external review, the ACA
provides no explicit ongoing state carve-out.289 The ACA’s regulatory
guidance assumes that states retain the prerogative to enact more
consumer-protective rules. That is, the federal agencies’ view of the
ACA is that it serves as a floor.290 But the language of the ACA itself,
unlike with respect to external review, does not explicitly provide that
states possess residual authority to regulate the relationship between
internal and judicial review. It is certain that litigation reformers
sounding the anti-judicial theme will cast state efforts to enact
claimant-friendly rules as somehow “prevent[ing] the application” of
the ACA merely by diminishing the importance of internal review.
287. Supra Part III.B.2.
288. Supra Part III.B.3.
289. The explicit incorporation of state law for internal review is limited to state
law in effect at the time of the ACA’s enactment: March 23, 2010. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg19(a)(2)(B).
290. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage
Relating to Status of Grandfathered Health Plans under the ACA, 75 Fed. Reg.
34,538, 34,540 (June 17, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590) (“State laws that
impose on health insurance issuers requirements that are stricter than the
requirements imposed by the Affordable Care Act will not be superseded by the
Affordable Care Act.”).
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Assume, for example, that a particular state requires judges to
interpret insurance contracts using contra proferentem without
exception. One expects arguments that such a state law would
“prevent the application” of 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a) by discouraging
people from fully participating in internal review processes.
Some of the territory discussed above falls within the specific
analyses undertaken in Part III.B, and seems to have little hope of
success absent a strained reading of the preemption clause and a
studied effort to avoid the implication of the implementing
regulations. But that is part of the point: the anti-judicial theme
draws its strength from a purposive analysis, potentially overwhelming
more granular analyses of how the various remedial tracks interact.
Given the statute as a whole, this theme is subject to superficially
appealing purposive justifications, so much so that it may in practice
be recast as something more palatable than an “anti-judicial” instinct.
An enormous part of the debate over the ACA was whether it would
reduce the cost of health care and health insurance.291 The latter was
important to many observers not only because cost always matters,
but also because of the ACA’s requirement that everyone purchase
insurance. If everyone has to purchase insurance, then immediately
the cost of insurance becomes an even more scrutinized issue.292
Anti-judicial reformers will argue that, because the ACA requires
everyone to purchase insurance, judicial review is implicitly but
significantly limited by the legislation; otherwise expansive judicial
review would make insurance more costly, and unlike normal goods,
there is no option not to buy it. It will be effortless to find extensive
passages of legislative history that describe one of the statute’s aims as
reducing costs; the title of the Act itself includes the word
“affordable.” State laws that provide expansive judicial remedy, the
argument goes, would frustrate this implied purpose of the ACA.
Note the irony that this argument is a self-fulfilling prophecy on the
“federal takeover” of health insurance.293
A more sophisticated version of this theory might argue that states
are, under the ACA, expected to foot the bill for essential health

291. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act,
72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1393–95 (2011) (describing the hotly contested debate
between supporters and opponents of the ACA about whether it would reduce the
cost of health care).
292. The individual mandate is set forth in the ACA at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A
(requiring purchase of coverage).
293. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation:
State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 593 (2011)
(describing various objectors as decrying a “‘federal’ takeover of health care”).
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benefits above a certain floor.294 Although this “pay the freight”
provision only explicitly applies to essential health benefits, which do
not include rules of remedy, it might be conscripted in furtherance
of establishing a general notion that the ACA disfavors expansive
remedy beyond some indication that states can pay for it. And since
there is no obvious mechanism by which a state can pay for a more
expansive remedy, the implication is that the ACA permits states to
offer judicial remedies no more costly than those offered by ERISA.
Otherwise, the ACA’s subsidies to individuals will in effect buy less
actual health insurance coverage, because, presumably, states with
more expansive remedy will have higher policy prices. Features of a
state law that might fall to or be limited by this type of argument
include consequential and punitive damages, jury rights, the
availability and level of judicial review, and burdens of proof.
There are innumerable imaginable variations. Each one, however,
will amount to sub rosa litigation reform—limiting, nationwide,
judicial remedy. And that is why I have categorized this as an antijudicial theme, rather than one seeking to reduce consumer cost.
Put simply, the objective is to limit judicial remedy, i.e., litigation.
The challenges to this theme are, first, that neither specific provisions
of the ACA nor the obvious intent of its implementing regulations,
are friendly to it. The second, again, is federalism. It seems quite
clear that almost all litigation-limiting rules urged in furtherance of
this theme would fall within the discretion of states.295 The virtues of
federalism do not wane when applied to remedy; that judicial
preference for federalism by self-professed proponents often vanishes
on questions of remedy is regrettable, not commendable.296 The ACA
contemplates federalism over judicial policy preference; the antijudicial theme invites, of certain-minded judges, the opposite. I hope
that invitation will be declined.
294. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i)–(ii); see also Maher & Pathak, supra note 205,
at 77 (explaining how the “pay-the-freight” provision works).
295. This runs counter to the “consumer choice” theme, which would scrutinize
closely whether state law, by limiting judicial review, was meaningfully limiting a
consumer’s remedial options. If it were, consumer choice theme adherents would
urge preemption. I do not at this time see a specific justification for that view of
preemption in the statute, but for practical reasons I have not analyzed the question
in close detail. Namely, the consumer choice theme represents a view of the ACA
that may take root in the future (perhaps as soon as the next presidency, if a
Democratic president succeeds President Obama) rather than today. Given the
current judiciary, it seems the primary battle will be between themes described in
Parts IV.C (anti-judicialism) and IV.D (non-judicial justice).
296. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (remarking that the majority’s use of preemption to strike down
California’s judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers
in consumer contracts “do[es] not honor federalist principles”).
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D. The ACA as Non-Judicial Justice

A third theme, and a milder alternative to the two set forth in Parts
IV.B and IV.C, might be called “the ACA as non-judicial justice.” This
theme draws upon the ACA’s extensive regulation of internal and
external review to conclude that the legislation intends to ensure that
coverage disputes must always, at the election of the insured, be
resolvable by a competent and impartial non-judicial actor operating
under fair procedures. Beyond that core requirement, this theme leaves
the remainder of remedial choices to be resolved by “residual
authorities” whose power pre-dated the ACA: by federal authorities in
the self-insured context, by state authorities in the individual insurance
context, and by a little of both in the group-insured context.297
Supplemental state regulation that does not undermine the
competence, impartiality, and fairness of non-judicial procedures
would be permitted even if, in practice, it limited consumer choice.
Similarly, residual authorities would resolve the proper role that
litigation and judicial review are to play. Under this view, a state
might be within its rights to severely limit judicial review in the
aftermath of a no-coverage finding by both the internal and external
reviewer, absent some concrete showing by the plaintiff that
malfeasance occurred. In the other direction, a state might be
entirely free to view internal and external review as entirely optional,
adopting in practice the consumer choice view and leaving expansive
judicial remedies fully intact in all circumstances.298
This theme seems closest to what Congress intended, and largely
but not entirely tracks the agency commentary preceding the
implementing regulations.299 It also has the merit (or vice) of
federalism. If this theme dominates, litigation reform battles will
297. See supra Part III.B. The distinction between the two themes is subtle but
important. The “consumer choice” theme aims to provide consumers with a choice
of options even where non-judicial review is fair. The “non-judicial justice” theme is
essentially indifferent to a consumer’s option for judicial review, if non-judicial
review is reliably fair. They shade together to the extent one argues that only robust
judicial review can ensure non-judicial review is reliably fair.
298. Federal authorities would have less residual freedom to act, because they are
confined in their choices by ERISA.
299. See, e.g., Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals
and External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,213 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pt. 117) (commenting that “[w]hen plans and issuers offer full and fair
internal procedures for resolving claims, it is reasonable to insist that claimants first
turn to those procedures before seeking judicial or external review of benefit
denials”). On the other hand, agency insistence that an exhaustion requirement not
be permitted unless near-strict adherence to the internal review requirements are
met—which applies to the states, see supra Part II.B, resembles more the “consumer
choice” theme. So perhaps the prevailing agency view lies somewhere between
theme IV.B and IV.D, but closer to the latter.
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largely occur in state legislatures and state courts across the country.
One expects those battles to turn out very differently in Massachusetts
than in Utah. The challenge to this theme is that it is very difficult
for anyone, including judges, to remain faithful to it; much more
tempting is to adopt this theme at the top of an opinion and then
carve out exceptions consistent with one’s policy preferences.
CONCLUSION
Perfectly clear and comprehensive statutes are the holy grail of law
but as frequently found. In reality, any piece of legislation is
necessarily an imperfect representation of its drafters’ intentions.
The Affordable Care Act is hardly an exception. It is a sprawling
enactment that incorporates by reference extraordinarily complex
external authorities. It is the product of a unique political process,
one that did not include the fine tuning that precedes the adoption
of many statutes.300 It is the most contentious legislation in decades.
Litigation regarding what portions of its text “mean” is inevitable.
Given the ubiquity and cost of health insurance disputes, of
particular interest is the ACA’s treatment of remedies for insureds.
This Article carefully identifies, for the first time, a series of
interpretative fights to expect in the coming litigation to define
litigation. Some of the battles are esoteric but of great practical
consequence.301 Others pose profound questions about federal
versus state power and the judicial role in mediating it. The biggest
question of all may be the simplest: will the ACA serve as an agent of
nationwide litigation reform?
Although the ACA does effect important changes to remedy, read
correctly it does not impose a federal ceiling on state prerogative to
fashion consumer-friendly remedies consistent with the policy
preferences of the state. The ACA is not federal litigation reform.
The place for litigation reform in the world of the ACA is the states,

300. See supra note 224.
301. Firestone deference is the best example of an obscure but important doctrine
that the ACA alters and massively weakens. See infra Part III.B.2. While the
significance of this change has largely escaped academic comment, the Supreme
Court will surely pay close attention. Firestone deference has reached the Supreme
Court on three occasions—in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108
(1989) (articulating the principle); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117
(2008) (explaining that Firestone deference survives a conflict of interest); and
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 520–21 (2010) (explaining that Firestone
deference survives fiduciary mistake)—and the current Chief Justice has written
approvingly of the important functions it serves. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &
Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 259 (2008) (Roberts, C.J, concurring) (applauding
Firestone as desirable policy).

MAHER.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 2:41 PM

714

[Vol. 63:649

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

which retain great freedom to so act. Federalism lives, in the very
statute accused of killing it.
So it should be construed, but strong extra-statutory forces
complicate the picture. Health care is still perceived as too
expensive. Traditional remedies are feared to be too volatile and too
costly. The Supreme Court seems to believe that non-judicial
resolutions are cheaper and better than litigation.
And the
antecedent example is worrisome. ERISA, passed as a protective
shield, was transformed by federal judges into a sword to separate
approximately 150 million beneficiaries from protections otherwise
provided by states.302 Much of that work was done by implicit, rather
than express, authority. Litigation reform proponents will seek to
repeat that success. The degree to which they will succeed is
impossible to predict. Even still, they may well be more successful
than the 111th Congress intended.303

302. See supra Part I.A.
303. I say this based both on the text and structure of the statute as well as the
political circumstances of the legislation’s passage. In the 111th Congress, the
Democrats controlled both the House and Senate, and the ACA was signed by
President Barack H. Obama, a Democrat. Generally speaking, Democrats do not
support litigation reform, let alone national litigation reform.

